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1. S ee Alfred W. Ch an da, Zam bia’s Fledgling Democracy: Prospects for the
Future , 25-28 ZAMBIA L.J . 125, 125-26 (1993 -96). 
2. In  Afrika an s, ap ar th eid lit era lly mea ns s epa ra ten ess. S ee TWEETALIGE
SKOOL-WO O R DE B O E K [TWO LA N GU A GE  SCHOOL DICTIONARY] 21 (9t h e d. 1 987 ).
3. S ee CEN TRAL  IN T E L LI G E N CE  AGENCY , TH E  WORLD F ACTBO O K  295 (1995)
[hereinafter  F ACTBOOK].
4. S ee Zam bia, KCWD/Ka leidoscope, available in  LE XIS, World L ibra ry, P rofil
File.  
5. S ee M alawi, KCWD/Ka leidoscope, available in  LE XIS, W orld  Libr ar y, P rofil
File.
6. S ee Leso tho, KCWD/Kale idoscope, available in  LEXIS, World  Libra ry, P rofil
File.
7. Leso tho rat ified a new constitu tion in 1993; Malawi in 19 9 4;  Na m ibia in
1990; South Africa in 1993 and 1996; and Za m bia in  1991 (with  am endm ent s in
199 6).  S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . (199 6);  J O H N  DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW : A SO U TH
AFRI CAN  P ERS PE CTIVE  339 (1 994); F ACTBOOK, supra  note 3, at  244, 295, 469; Malawi,
supra  not e 5; Mun a B. N dulo & Robe rt  B. Ken t, Constitutiona lism in  Zam bia: Past,
Presen t and Fu ture, 40 J.  AF R . L. 256 , 271 -75 (1 996 ). Th e 19 93 S out h Afr ica n
Con st itu tion  was n a m ed t he  “Int er im ” Cons tit ut ion,  sin ce it  wa s dr aft ed p ri or t o th e
fully par ticipat ory election s in 199 4 an d since it  provided  for an othe r, fina l
cons tit ut ion  to  be  d ra ft ed  a ft e r  the  ele ction s. S ee DUGARD, supra , at 3 39. The  “Final”
Con st itu tion  was ra tified in  1996 . Th e F ina l Con st itu tion  pr escr ibes  th at  lit iga tion
pending before th a t  constitution came int o effect would be determ ined under  the
Int erim  Const itu tion  un less t he in ter est s of just ice req uir e oth erw ise. S ee S. AF R .
CO N S T . sched. 6, § 17 (1996).  Th us  far , no d ecis ions  of Sou th  Africa ’s h igh est  cour t,
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Religiou s F reedom  in  Sou ther n  Africa : Th e
Develop in g J ur ispr ude nce
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 D u r in g t h e  19 90 s,  m a n y coun t r ie s i n s ou t h e r n Africa
became mor e dem ocrat ic.1 Apartheid’s2 dem ise in  Sout h Africa
has eclipsed m edia  a t t e n t ion , a s w ell  as p olit ica l, economic a nd
lega l sch ola r sh ip , bu t  other  count r ies  in  the r egion h a v e a lso
undergone impor t an t  changes.  Sou th  Afr i ca’s ru le of Sou th-
West Afr ica  ended and  that  na tion  becam e dem ocrat ic
Namibia .3 One-par ty ru le yielded t o mu ltip ar ty elect ions in
Zam bia  (1991)4  and M ala wi (1 993).5 Mil it a ry  ru le  and a  ban  on
pol it ica l act ivity in  Lesoth o ended  an d free  elections  wer e he ld
in  1993.6 F ive sou the rn Afr i can  coun t ries ra tified new
cons t itu t ions (includin g new  bills  of rights) since 1991,
pr ovid in g gr ea ter  freedom s for  cit izens of t hes e n a t ion s. 7
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t he Con st itu tion al C our t, h ave  bee n d ecide d u nd er  th e F ina l Con st itu tion .
8. S ee Cha nda , supra  note  1, at  135-36 (discussin g a  n u mber of challenges
facing de mo cra cy in  Zam bia  tod ay ).
9. S ee Zi m bab we: M ug gin g Di ssen t , EC O N O M I S T, Aug. 19, 1995, at 38;
Zi m bab we: Tak ing Risks, EC O N O M I S T, Oct . 21, 1 995,  at  46; Zim babwe: Walk - over ,
E C O N O M I S T, Mar . 16, 1996, a t 46. 
10. S ee F ACTBOOK, supra  note 3, at  403.
11. S ee Chen  Bligna ut , Mos qu e Bom b: Mu slim s Dem an d A ction  (visited Oct. 15,
1997) <htt p://164.88.55.123/Archives/Ja n97toMay97/9701/15%20Ja n/pa gad08.h tm l>
(from  the  Sou th  Af rica n C AP E  AR G U S new spa per ); Ja n Ra at h, Zim babwe: Zim
Chri st ians Attack M uslim s, AF R . NEWS , Feb . 7, 1997, available in  LEXIS, World
Libra ry,  Allwld File; Scott  Str au s, In Zam bia, Race Hatred Sim mers , BALTIMORE SU N ,
J an . 26, 1996, a t 2A, avai lab le  in  LEXIS, News Librar y, Balsun File.
12. S ee Molapo v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1997 SACLR LEXIS 13, *18
(Les oth o Ju ne 18, 19 97) (“Admitt edly it is  hard to imagine any country with a worse
reco rd of viol at ion s of h um an  ri gh ts  th an  Sou th  Afri ca. ”).
13. S ee infra  Part  II.
14. F o r instance, the new South African Constit u tions establish a  new
Cons t i tu t iona l Court to hea r final appeals on all constitut ional matt er s . S ee S. AF R .
CO N S T . § 167 (1996). Chapter  9 of the Fina l Constitution discusses a nu mber of other
“s t a t e institu tions supportin g constitu tional democracy” inclu ding, a mon g oth ers , a
Pu blic Pr ote ctor , Hu ma n R igh ts  Com mi ssi on, C omm iss ion for  th e  P r om ot ion  and
Pr ote ction  of th e Rig ht s of Cu ltu ra l, Re ligiou s a nd  Lin gu ist ic Com mu nit ies,
Com mi ssi on  for Gender  Equ alit y. See id.  ch. 9  (out lin ing  th e r oles  of st at e in st itu tion s
suppor t ing con st it ut ion al  de mo cra cy).
15. S ee Bar bar a Cr osset te, Mandela Moving to Center  of  African Peace Efforts,
N.Y. TI M E S, May 4, 1997, at 20 (discussing Mandela’s  ro le  in  Afr ican
“statesm anship”); N eigh borh ood W at ch i n S out her n A fri ca, ECON O M I S T, Dec. 3, 1994,
a t  51 (ca llin g Ma nd ela  th e “n at ur al  ar bit er  for  th e [s ou th er n Afr ican] re gion” in
p romot ing pe ace  an d d em ocr acy ).
Coun t r ies in south ern  Africa, however, ar e by no mean s
model examples of freedom . For in st an ce, since 1991, Za mbia
has held two multipa rt y elections, yet t her e ar e ma ny other
a reas (such  as  lega l  reform , r espect  for  the  ru le  of l aw,  and
freedom  of the p res s) in wh ich fur th er d emocra tic change is
needed.8 Zimba bwe h as  an  effectively one-part y political system
tha t  some say stifles individual liberties.9 Politica l pa rt ies in
Swazi land ar e illegal. 10 And in ter ms of religious libert ies,
Hindus and Muslims  ar e often  persecut ed in sout her n Africa by
mem bers  of other  reli gion s. 11 While Sou th  Afr ica ’s  human
r igh t s recor d h a s hist orically been t he poorest in  south ern
Afr ica ,1 2  it s a boli t ion  of apa r theid  and i t s n ew const it u t ion a l
disp ens at ion has  made i t  a  leader in d emocracy for oth er
sou the rn Afr ica n  nations.13 The country has esta blished a
nu mber  of new  inst itu tion s t o prot ect d em ocracy.14 I t s
celebrated  president , Nels on  Ma nde la , is  a  pow er fu l for ce for
democracy in sou the rn Afr ica .15 Cur ren t ly , South  Africa ma y be
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16. S ee supra  notes 8-11.
17. One exception is In  re Ch ikw ech e, 19 95 (4) S A 284 (Zim b.); see infra  notes
238-42 and  accompanying t ext .
18. One not ab le e xcep tion  is  Dan iel D. Ns ere ko, Religious Liberty and the Law
in  Bo tswana, 34 J . CH U R C H  & ST . 843 (1992) (di scuss ing the large measu r e  of  religiou s
l ibe r ty in  Bot sw an a).  A number  o f p ieces  on  Sou th  Africa have been published,
includin g: Lour ens  M. du  Ples sis, Religious  Human  R igh ts in  S out h A fri ca, in
RE L I G IO U S H U M A N  RI G H T S  IN  GLOBAL P E R S P E CT I VE  441 (Joha n D. van  der Vyver & J .
Witte, J r .  eds., 199 6) (re view ing  th e ch an ges  ma de t o re ligiou s fr eed om b y Sou th
Africa ’s new const itu tion s); Tra cy Kupe ru s, Resisting or Embracing Reform? South
Africa’s Dem ocrat ic T ran sit ion  an d N GK-S tat e Rel ati ons , 38 J . CH U R C H  & ST . 841
(1996) (sur veying  th e r ela ti on sh ip—e sp ecia lly r ece nt ly—of a n  impor t an t  South  Afr ican
church  an d th e Sout h African s t at e); H.P.P  Lött er, Religion  and  Pol it i cs  in  a
Transforming S out h A fri ca, 34 J . CH U R C H  & ST . 475  (1992) (examin ing religion’s role
in  the Sout h African political arena ); Tam ara  Rice Lave, Not e, A Nat ion at Prayer,
a N at ion  in  Ha te: Ap art hei d i n S out h A fri ca, 30 STAN . J . IN T’L L. 483 (1994)
(di scuss ing th e pa rt  religion  playe d in t he a par th eid sys tem ). 
19. S ee S v. Solberg, 1997 SACLR LEXIS 3 0 (CC Oct. 6, 1997); Fra ser  v.
Ch ildren ’s Cou rt , Pr et oria  Nor th , 199 7 (2) SA 2 61 (CC ); In  re Dispu te Concern ing the
Cons t it u t iona l it y of Certain P rovisions of the Gau teng School Edu cation Bill of 1995,
1996 (3) SA 1 65 (C C).
20. S ee Mola po v.  Dir ect or of P ub lic P rosecutions, 1997 SACLR LEXIS 13, *15-
*19 (Les oth o Ju ne 18, 1997) (Les oth o Hig h C our t a dopt ing  cons tit ut iona l la w de cision s
the st ronges t  de mocracy in  the r egion , es pe cia lly  in  ligh t  of
problems in other souther n African countries,16 and  is  set t ing
the t r end in sou the rn Afr i ca  in  t e rms of human  r igh t s  and
freedoms. While some sou t h ern  Afr i can  coun t r ie s a r e
regressing in  t heir comm itm ent s t o democra cy, South  Africa is
boldly moving ahead.
There is cert ain ly an  oppor tun ity for  Sou th  Afr ica  to set  the
ju r i sp ruden t ia l tr end  in t erm s of religious fr eedom  case la w in
sou the rn Africa. Ther e ha ve not  been  many r ecen t  fr eedom of
reli gion  case s in  sou ther n  Afr ica n  cou r t s,17 nor h as t her e been
much academic wr it ing about  r e ligious  fr eedom in sou the rn
Afr ica  as  a  whole.1 8  However, in th e last  two years , thr ee
impor tan t  cases involving religious freedom ha ve been decided
in  South  Afr ica .19 These  South  Afr ican  case s  a r e t he r eli giou s
freedom  jur ispr ud en ce sa plin gs tha t  lik ely  wil l gr ow in to more
esta blished jur ispr ude nt ia l oa ks b oth  in  Sou th  Afr ica  and
hopefu lly the r es t  of sou ther n  Afr ica . E ven  though  e a ch
sou th e r n Afr ican  count ry  is  independen t  and  thei r  cour t s  have
no obliga t ion  to follow the case l aw of other  coun t r i es , i t  is  the
p ract i ce of the h igh es t  cour t s of t hes e cou nt r ie s t o
exa min e—a nd in  many ca se s fol low—e a ch  others’ jud icia l
d e c i s i o n s . 2 0  T h i s  w i l l  i n c r e a s -
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of Na mibia  an d Sout h Africa in  case in volving a crimina l defendan t ’s  r igh t  t o
infor ma tion  in th e police docket); S v. Heidenr eich, 1995 SACLR LEXIS 291, *18-*23
(N a m ib . Nov . 13 , 19 95) (N am ibia  High  Court  decision qu oting a ppr ovingly at  lengt h
a  Zimbabw e constit ut ional la w decision dis cussin g the righ t t o a fair h ear ing wit hin
a  reas onable time); S v. Williams , 1995 (3) SA 632, 642, 645 (CC) (Sou th  Africa n
Cons t i tu t iona l Court  discuss ing and r elying upon cases from Namibia, Zimbabwe,
Botswana , an d Le sot ho in  corp ora l pu nis hm en t ca se); P at el v. At tor ne y Gener al,  No.
3 6 6  o f  1 9 9 3  ( Z a m b i a )  ( v i s i t e d  S e p t .  2 5 ,  1 9 9 7 )
<htt p://zam lii.zamne t.zm/court s/high/full/93hc366.htm >; In re Munh ume so, 1995 (1) SA
551, 556 (Zimb.) (Zimbabwe Su prem e Court cas e associating its elf with Botswan a
cons t i tu t iona l case). But see Att or ne y-Ge ne ra l v. D ow, 1 992  SAC LR LEXIS 7, *27
(Bots. Ju ly 3, 1992 ) (Bots wa na  Appe al C our t r elyin g on B ots wa na n a ut hor iti es on
poin t of constitutional law, but mentioning support for sam e  p os it ion  from, among
o ther  jur isdiction s, N a m ibia a nd Zim babwe ); China mora  v. Angwa F ur nish ers  (Pvt)
Ltd ., 1996 SACLR LEXIS 54, *41-*46 (Zimb. Nov. 28, 1996) (Zimbabwe Suprem e
Cou rt  exam inin g at  lengt h, bu t n ot following becaus e of distingu ish i n g f a cts, two
Sou th  African Constitutional Court decisions). In fact, the South African Int e r im  and
F ina l Con st it ut ion s s peci fical ly gi ve cou rt s t he  powe r t o exa mi ne  fore ign  case law t o
interpr et  the S ou t h  African B ill of Rights . S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . § 35(1) (1993); S. AF R .
CO N S T . § 39(1) (19 96); see also Richard C am eron  Blak e, The  Wor ld ’s  Law in  One
Country: The South  Af rica n Constitutional Court’s Use of Public International Law ,
115 S. AF R . L.J . __ (for th com in g 19 98).
21. S ee Molapo,  1997 SACLR LEXIS a t *16-*19 (Lesoth o High Cou rt  following
decis ion  of Sou th  Africa n C ons tit ut iona l Cou rt ); Chinam ora, 19 96  SAC LR  LE XIS a t
*21-*25, *41-*46 (Zimbabwe S upr eme C ourt  not following becau se of distin guish ing
facts, but exam inin g at  len gth  beca us e of t he ir  pr eced en tia l st re ng th , tw o Sou th
Afr ica  Con st itu tion al C our t d ecis ions  on civ il im pr ison me nt , as  well  as  th e h ist ory  of
civil im pr iso nm en t i n S ou th  Afri ca).
22. Botswana , Les oth o, Na mi bia , Sou th  Africa , Swazila nd, a nd Zim babwe  all
ha ve as pect s of Rom an -Du tch  la w  in  th eir s yste ms . S ee F ACTBOOK, supra  no te 3 , a t
56, 244,  295,  389,  403,  471.  Les oth o, Ma law i, Sou t h  Af rica, Zamb ia a nd Zim babwe  all
ha ve En glish com mon  law ch ar acte rist ics. See id.  a t 244, 261, 389, 469, 471.
Botswa n a , Mala wi, Swazila nd, a nd Zam bia a ll include cu stom ar y law, m ean ing
t rad i t iona l African la w, in t heir  syst ems  as w ell. See id.  at 56, 261, 403, 469.
23. S ee infra  Part  III.
24. Cou r t s in t he  var ious  sou th er n Afr ican  coun tr ies  ar e n ot b oun d t o follow
each  others ’ decisions; however, as shown supra  not es 12, 2 0  a nd  accompanying t ext ,
these  cou rt s oft en  ar e p er su ad ed  by t he  leg al  re as on in g in  a s ou th er n Afr i ca n  decis ion
and will  “adop t” it s r ea son in g a nd  hol din g. Th us  a d ecis ion  of one  sou th er n Afr ica n
cour t  that a nother southern African court chooses to follow is a  typ e of “persuasive”
ingly be tr ue w it h  res pe ct  to followin g South  Afr ica ’s
decis ion s, 21 as m an y south ern  African count ries’ legal system s
a re ba se d on  Sou th  Afr ica ’s m ixed Roma n -D u t ch and E nglish
common law syst em. 22 Additionally, the bills of right s cont ained
in  sou thern  Afr ican  cons t itu t ions  can  be read sim ilar ly to Sou th
Afr ica ’s cons t it u t ion , e specia lly a s  it  r e la t e s t o t he  protect ion  of
freedom  of religion .23 Th us,  it  is  ver y likely  tha t  thes e S outh
Afr ica n  religious freedom cas es will be us ed a s “pers ua sive
p receden t”24 in other souther n African countries.
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pr eced en t—n ot  legally binding on th e second court , but useful as per suasive r eason ing
nonetheless.
25. These coun tr ies  in clu de B ots wa na , Le sot ho,  Ma la wi, N am ibia , Sou th  Africa ,
Swaziland, Zambia  an d Zimbabw e. Angola a nd Moza mbiqu e ar e also locat ed in
sou t he rn Africa, but since these count ries have different colonial an d legal histories
they  are not exam ined in  th is Comm ent . S ee F ACTBOOK, supra  note 3, at  11, 293
( st a t ing tha t  both  Angola  and  Mozambique’s  l ega l systems  a re der ived  from
Portuguese  civil  la w a nd  cus tom ar y la w).
26. S ee generally J O H N DUGARD, H U M A N  RI G H TS  A ND  T H E  SO U T H  AFRI CAN  LE G AL
OR D E R (1978) (describin g th e violation s of hum an  righ ts  in  Sou th  Af r ican  l aw dur ing
ap ar th eid ).
27. S ee T .R .H . DAVENPORT , SO U T H  AFRICA: A MO D E R N  H ISTORY 466, 473 (4th ed.
1991) (describin g the effort s of t he  Fr ont -lin e S ta te s (es se nt ia lly a ll of Sou th  Africa ’s
sou the rn African neighbors) to establish economic boycotts against , and th us isolate,
Sou th  Afr i ca  th rough  organ iza t ion  of  the  Sou the rn  Af r ican  Developme n t  Coordina t ing
Con fer en ce).
28. S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . § 167 (199 6) (di scu ss in g t he  ne w Con st it ut ion al  Cou rt ).
Th is Comment  accompli shes severa l pu rposes . F ir s t , i t
reviews South  Afr ica ’s lega l pa st  an d pr esen t, es pecially a s it
relat es t o r eligious freedom. N ext, it compreh ensively ana lyzes
reli giou s freedom  claus es foun d in  the  cons t it u t ions  of sou the rn
Afr ica n  count r ies.25 Fina lly, th is Commen t a na lyzes the t hr ee
Sou th Afri can  religiou s fr eedom cases  decided thus  fa r ,
sugges t s th e proper  in ter pr et a t ion s a nd p oten t ia l we aknes se s of
the case s,  and d iscuss es  their  pos sible  futu re  app li ca t ion  to
other sou thern  Afr ican  nations. Th is  Comment  concludes  tha t
the sou thern  Afr ican  cons tit ut iona l pr ovisions r ela tin g to
reli giou s freedom  a re similar enough to be interpreted th e
same—and tha t t hey a re in fact beginn ing to be inter pret ed
sim ilar ly. Additionally, the Sout h African religious liberty cases
tha t  have been decided thus far are sound ca se  l aw tha t
power fully pr otect  freedom  of reli gion  and  shou ld be used  as
“pers ua sive pr ecede nt” in fu ture r eli giou s free dom ca ses in
other southern African countries.
II. RE L I G I O U S  F R E E D OM  AN D  T H E  LA W O F  SO U TH  AF R I C A
 Sou th  Afr ica ’s  human righ ts  record  ha s h ist orically been the
poorest  in  sou ther n  Afr ica .26 O ther  na t ions in  th e re gion
act ively lobbied against its apar th eid regime. 27 However, after
the d ra ft ing of tw o new cons tit ut ions s ince 19 91, t he
es tabl ishment  of a n ew court for constitut ional appeals,28 and
the format ion  of a  number  of new in st it u t ion s t o pr otect
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29. S ee supra  note 14.
30. S ee supra  notes 8-11.
31. S ee C h a n d a , supra  note  1, at  134 (“Zam bia h as n ot fully complet ed its
tr an sit ion  to dem ocracy.”); Th oma s Ca rot her s, The Ru le of Law Revival , F OR . AF R .,
Mar .-Apr . 1998, at 95, 98.
32. F o r exp la na ti on of t he  In te ri m a nd  Fi na l Sou th  Africa n C onst it utions, see
supra  note 7.
33. S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . § 167 (1996) (discussing t he n ew Const itu tiona l Cour t ).
34. S ee supra  note 14.
35. S ee du P lessis , supra  note 18, at  443.
36. S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . §§ 34(2), 3 4(3) (198 3); see also Pe t e r  N.  Levenberg, S o u th
Africa’s Consti tution: Will  i t  Last?, 29 IN T’L LAW . 633, 655  (1995 ) (“Sout h Afr ica n
cour t s had a lmost no power to review or reverse acts of Parliam ent  on  any
cons t i tu t iona l ground . . . . [They] did have a limited power t o  revie w de lega te d or
subord ina te legislat ion—th at  is, th e legislat ion of a provin cial ass embly or  execut ive
body—and we re  pe rm it te d t o r evi ew  th e va lid it y of a n e xecu ti ve a ct o r o rd er .”).
dem ocracy,29 Sou t h  Africa  ma y be th e st ron gest  dem ocracy in
the region, especially in light of problems  in  othe r  sou the rn
Afr ica n  count ries.30 While other  coun t r i es ’ t r ans it ions  to fu l l
democracy have stagnat ed,31 Sou th  Africa  has  been  ab le  to
main ta in  it s p rogr es sion  toward d em ocracy. This  se ct ion
explores South Africa’s apart heid past in terms of religious
liberty as w ell  as t he ch anges  to pr otect ion  of reli giou s fr eedom
tha t  have occurr ed since the beginning of apart heid’s dem ise in
1991. These chan ges in religious freedom, illustr a t ive of other
gua ran tees of fundamenta l  human  r igh t s  in  the  Sou th  Afr ican
In ter im and F inal Constitut ions,32 t ogether  wi th  improvements
in  judicia l33 and other institut ions protecting huma n rights,34
make Sout h Africa t he lea der  in de mocra tic r eform in  sou t h ern
Africa t oday.
A. Th e Apartheid E ra (1948-1993)
 Dur ing  the apar theid e ra , the law of Sout h Africa included a
“cons t itu t ion”; however , it wa s n ot t he s up rem e law  of the la nd
an d did  not  conta in a  bill of right s.35 Constit ut ional issues  were
govern ed by th e pr inciple  of par liam en ta ry s overeign ty,  and
Sou th Afr i can  cour t s  cou ld on ly s t r ike  down  act s  of Pa r liam en t
if th ey det erm ined  th e const itu tion  was  not  pr ocedur ally
sa tisfied in pass ing the  act .36 Pa r l iament  there fore  had a  g rea t
dea l of latit ude t o enact legislation with out fear  of an y other
body decla rin g it in valid  as  a viola tion  of some r ight .
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37. S ee du P lessis , supra  note 18, at 443-45; J.D. van der Vyver, R eligi on , in
23 TH E  LA W  OF  SO U T H  AFRICA 197-200 (W.A. J ouber t & T.J . Scott  eds., 19 86). 
38. F o r e x a mple, see the “Church Clause” in § 9(7) of the Nat ives (Urban Area s)
Consolidat ion  Act 25 of 1945; § 4 of Inte rn al Secu rit y Act 74 of 1982 (allowing
relig ious  bodies to be banne d); § 2 of Affected Or ganizat ions Act 31 of 1974. On Sout h
Africa n  law, politics and religious history, see Lave, supra  note 18.
39. S ee Lave , supra  note 18, at  499-501.
40. S ee id . at 501, 505.
41. S ee id. at 510.
42. S ee van  der  Vyver, supra  note 37, at  197.
43. Id . at  197, quot ing § 1 of Publications Act 42 of 1974.
44. S ee id . at 197-98.
45. S ee id . at 198-200.
46. S ee id . at 200.
47. § 9(7) of Natives (Urban  Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945.
48. S ee van  de r  Vyver, supra note 37, at 191 (claiming that the Chu rch Clause
was ne ver  in vok ed ).
The law during the apart heid era had a pr on oun ced
Chr ist ian  bias.37 Addition ally, pa rlia me n t often  impinged
freedom  of reli gion  to pr omote a pa r theid  pol icie s or  to cont rol
pol it ica l insur rect ion .38 Dur ing th e apa rt heid er a, th e chur ches
were  involved in politics. The Dut ch Reform ed Chu r ch  (known
in  Afrikaan s as Nederdu itse Gereform eerde Kerk (NG K))
provided the moral and philosophica l u nde rpinn in gs  for
Nationalist ap ar th eid policies.3 9  I t  a lso gave suppor t  t o
par t icu la r laws and made sta tements su pport ing the
govern men t’s act ion s.4 0  In r etu rn , the N GK received favored
t rea tment  from the govern men t. 41 This  pol it ica l u n ion  of church
and sta te produced analogous legal preferences.
Accordin g to J .D.  van  der  Vyver , a lea ding South  Afr ica n
lega l scholar a nd exper t on r eligious liber t y in  tha t  coun t ry,
many South  Afr ican laws p rotected Ch rist ian d octr ines a nd
practices.42 For exam ple, censorship u nder  the Publications Act
was invok ed t o prot ect “a Ch ris tia n view  of life.”43 Religiou s
ins tr uct ion in state schools had a Christian bias.44 Sunday
obser van ce laws requ ired a dher ence to the Ch rist ian S abba th ,
a s well as other Christian holy days.45 On ly Chr is t ia n  oaths
were adequate in criminal tribuna ls.46
Addit iona lly, th e religious libert y of blacks was  curt ailed by
apa r theid laws . F or  exa mple, t he “Ch urch Cla use ” of th e
Nat ives (Ur ba n  Area s) C onsol ida t ion  Act 47 a l lowed  a  ca binet
minist er  to p roh ibit B lacks  from a t t end ing church  serv ices
ou t side a  Black  residen t ia l  a rea .48 Fu rt her , chur ches a nd  th eir
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49. § 4 of In te rn al S ecu ri ty Act  74 of 19 82; see also van  der  Vyver, supra  no t e
37, at 192.
50. S ee § 2 of Affecte d Or gan iza tion s Act  31 of 19 74; see also van  der Vyver ,
supra  note 37, at  191-92.
51. S ee Joha n D. van der  Vyver, Constitutional Options for Post-Apartheid South
Af rica , 40 EMORY L.J . 745 , 74 5 (19 91).
52. S ee Hu gh Cor der , Tow ard s a S out h A frica n C ons tit ut ion , 57 MOD . L. RE V.
491, 495 -96 (1 994 ).
53. S ee van  der  Vyver, supra  note 51, at  760.
54. Although  th ere w as n o legal un derp inn ing  gu a r an tee ing  these  r igh t s,  t he
government  indicated its willingness to allow open discussion of pol i t ics . S ee NELSON
MANDELA , LONG WALK  TO F REEDOM  492-98 (1994) (mentioning Mandela ’s open
dis cus sion  of pol it ics i n s pe ech es  aft er  hi s r ele as e fr om  pr iso n).
55. S ee du P lessis , supra  no t e 18,  a t  449. For  comm en t on  oth er  poss ible  form s
the government  of South Africa could have t aken , see genera lly van  der  Vyver, supra
no te 51.
56. Each part y was allowed two representa tives, one of which was to be a
woman , an d tw o advisor s. S ee du P lessis , supra  note 18, at  449-50.
leader s were  “banned” under  t h e In t erna l Secur ity  Act .49
Organizations, includ ing chu rch es, en gagin g in polit ics  in
coope ra t ion  or  consu lt a t ion  with  a  foreign orga niza tion  could
be, an d were, declared  “affected orga nizat ions,” which forfeited
the organ iza t ion ’s  fore ign financia l suppor t .50 Apar theid ru le
gr ea t ly a ffect ed  in divid ua l fr eedom  of reli gion .
In  S ta t e Pr eside nt  F.W. de K lerk ’s 1990 P ar liam ent -openin g
speech , he pr omised a n ew cons t itu t iona l disp en sa t ion  in  wh ich
a l l Sou th  Afr i cans  might  pa r t icipa t e on a democratic basis.51 De
Klerk’s Na t iona l Part y (NP) repealed apar theid laws,
unban ned, un impr i soned,  and repa t r i a ted individuals and
un ban n ed organizations such as th e African Na tional Congress
(ANC), the Pa n-Africanist  Congr ess (P AC), and t he Com mu nis t
Pa r ty.52 F in a lly,  Ne lson Ma nde la  wa s r ele ase d fr om  p r ison in
ea r ly 1990.53 Beside s r eceiving free dom of per son by bein g
releas ed from  pr ison  or  exi le,  for  a ll p ract ica l purpos es , Black
lea de rs a lso recei ved  freedom  of sp eech, t hough t  and beli ef.54
B. Th e Interim Constitu tion (1993)
Sou th Afr icans  came to rea li ze  tha t  in  order t o dism an tle
ap ar th eid completely, they would n eed to adopt  a su prem e
con s t it u t ion  with a bill of rights.55 Int erest ed par ties wer e
equ ally r epres e nt ed  in  wr it in g t he t r ansi t ion a l con st it u t ion
beginn ing in ear ly March, 1993.56 Throughou t  the  process,  the
pa rt ies a cknowled ged t ha t a  fina l constit ut ion would  need  to be
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57. S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . § 14(1) (1993) (“Ever y pers on sh all ha ve th e righ t t o
fre edom  of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion, which shall include
acade mic fre ed om  in  in st it ut ion s of h igh er  lea rn in g.”).
58. S ee id . § 8 (“(1) Every person sh all ha ve th e righ t t o equa lity before t he la w
a n d to e qu al  pr ote cti on of t he  la w. (2) N o pe rs on s ha ll be  un fai rl y di scr im i n a t ed
aga ins t , direct ly or indir ectly, an d, with out d erogat i n g from t he gen era lity of this
p rov is ion , on one or  more  of the following groun ds in  par ticula r: ra ce, gender , sex,
eth nic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, dis a b il it y, religion, conscience,
bel ief,  cul tu re  or  la ng ua ge.  . . .”).
59. S ee id . § 14(2) (“Without der ogating from the gen er al it y of su bs ect ion  (1),
r e ligious observances may be conducted at state  or stat e-aided institut ions under r ules
es t ablished by an  ap pr opr iat e a ut hor ity  for t ha t p ur pose , pr ovide d t ha t s uch  re ligiou s
observances ar e con du cte d on  a n  equitab le  basi s  and a t tendance  a t  them is  free  and
volu nt ar y.”).
60. S ee id . s ched. 3  (st at in g t ha t i nd ivid ua ls t ak in g t he  oat h of office  can  ma ke
a  solemn affirma tion ra ther  tha n an  oath, t hus  omittin g the final word s “[s]o h e lp  m e
God ”).
61. S ee id . § 17 (“Every person shall ha ve t he  ri gh t t o fr ee dom  of as soci at ion .”).
62. S ee id . § 33 (discussin g th e circum sta nces wh en legis lat ion ma y violate  or
limit  th e a pp lica ti on  of fun da me nt al  ri gh ts ).
63. S ee id . § 34 (outlin ing  wh en  st at es of e me rg en cy can  lim it t he  ap plica tion
of fun da me nt al  ri gh ts ).
64. S ee id. § 14(1 ).
65. S ee du P lessis , supra  note 18 , at 4 59. This  is in conform ity wit h t he
In te rna t iona l Conven tion  on Civil a nd P olitical Righ ts. See id.
66. S ee NAMIB. CO N S T . § 21(b) (“All per son s sh all  ha ve t he  rig ht  to . .  . fre edom
of th ought , conscience an d belief, which s ha ll include a cadem ic freedom in  inst it u t ions
negotiat ed after  free an d full elections; subsequ ent ly, part ies
were  less dogmatic in reaching agreements du r ing th i s in it i a l
process. The  pa rt ies’ res ult , th e Int erim Cons titu tion, provided
for  free dem ocr a t ic na t iona l  elect ions  and  for  the  dra ft ing of a
F ina l Constitut ion by the represen t a t ives  e lected  in  tha t
ele ct ion . Un de r  the In ter im  Con st it u t ion , fr eedom  of religion is
protect ed th rough  va r iou s clause s,  in clu ding a  gen er a l fr eedom
of religion cla us e,57 a  cla use  forbid ding discr im in a t ion  on the
bas is of reli gion ,58 a  clause discu ss in g r eli giou s e du ca t ion
(includin g reli giou s ob ser vances at state institu tions or
schools),59 a  p rov is ion  dea ling w i th  oa ths  con t ra ry  to re ligious
beliefs,60 an d a freedom of association clause.61 These  r igh t s  can
be limited by eith er a  genera l limitat ions clause,62 or  the
decla ra tion  of a “st at e of emer gen cy.”63
Section  14(1), t he ge ner a l fr eedom  of reli gion  cla use , covers
freed om for a  var iet y of thou ght s.64 This indicat es, am ong oth er
things, t ha t  nonreligiousness is also protected.65 The
negot i ator s also included protection of “academ ic freedom ”
following  the exa mple of t he N amibi an  Con st it u t ion .66 However ,
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 2\ F I N A L \ B L A- F IN . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
524 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
of hi gh er  lea rn in g . . .  .”).
67. S ee id .
68. S ee Technical Committee of Theme Commi t t ee  Four ,  Exp lana tory
Memorandum § 8.5.2.1.
69. Du  Ples sis, supra  note 18, at  457.
70. S ee Et ienn e Mu rein ik, A Bridge to Where? Introducing the In teri m  Bi ll of
Rights, 10 S. AF R . J . H U M . RTS . 31, 45 (1994) (citing S. AF R . CO N S T . § 14(2) (199 3))
(“[R]eligiou s observances may be conducted at s tat e or stat e-aided i n stit ut ions . . .
provided [(a)] such religious observances are conducted on an equitable basis and  [(b)]
a t t endance at  th em  is fr ee  an d vol un ta ry .”).
71. Id . at 45.
72. S ee id . at 44-46.
t h i s ph ra se wa s left ou t of th e Fin al Con st itu tion . Accordin g to
a  memo issued  by the Techn ical Comm ittee of Theme
Commi t tee Four  (Bil l of Righ t s),  a lt hough  acade mic freedom
overlaps wit h  freedom  of belie f and op in ion , (“for example
freedom  of express ion, scient ific r esea rch ,  a ssocia t iona l
au tonomy, and aca dem ic right s”), it  is n ot comm only dea lt wit h
as pa rt  of this r ight , th e Na mib i a n  Cons tit ut ion bein g th e
exce pt ion .67 The  Techn ical Com mit te e pr oposed t ha t t he  righ t
should be dea lt with  elsewher e.68
Consp icuously  la cking  from the  cons t it u t ion  is  a  sepa ra t ion
of church and stat e. Professor  Lou ren s d u  Ples si s of t he
Univer s ity of Stellen bosch st at ed: “It wa s clear  th at  th e mu lti-
pa r ty negotia tor s h ad  no in te nt ion wh at soever  of usin g th e
Con st it u t ion  or  the Bill  of Right s t o er ect  a wa ll of s ep ara t ion
between  church  an d st at e.”69 Professor  E t ienne  Mure in ik of the
Univer s ity of Witwa ter sr and cr it icized  th is  la ck of sepa ra t ion ,
espe cially wit h  refe ren ce to sect ion 14(2), the  pr ovision allowin g
for  religious  cerem onies in  st at e ins tit ut ions, in cludin g
schools.70 He point ed out: “It is coming widely to be recognized
tha t  religious observa nces which carr y the en dorsem ent , ta cit
or  other wise , of a s ta te in st itu tion  ar e inh ere nt ly coercive.”71 He
ass ert ed th at  religious observa nces tha t  a re  st a te  sponsored can
ra rely  be condu cted on a fair a nd equ itabl e ba sis ,  and
a t tendance would not  be seen  as being free an d volun ta ry,  thus
fa ilin g t o meet  the r equir em en ts of s ect ion  14(2 ).72
C. Th e Final Constitu tion
 The F ina l Consti tut ion was d ra fted  by the Cons t itu t iona l
Assembly (CA), con si st in g of t he N at ion a l  Assembly  and the
Sena te; a t ota l of 490 r epr esen ta tives  from s even p olit ica l
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73. S ee TH E  CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY , CO N S T IT U T I ON S , DEMOCRACY AND A
SUMMARY O F  T H E  WORKING DRAF T  O F  TH E  NEW CONSTITUTION  pt . II  pa ra . 11  (199 5).
Cyril  Ramph osa was Chair person, and Leon Wessels was  Deputy Cha irpers on. S ee id .
para . 15.
74. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  T a l k  ( v i s i t e d  J a n .  2 6 ,  1 9 9 8 )
<ht tp://www.constit ut ion.org.za/t alk
. h t m l> .
75. S om e Facts About th e Wor ki ng  Dra ft of  th e N ew C ons tit ut ion  (visited Feb.
9, 1998) <htt p://www.constit ution .org.za/fct22115.htm l>.
76. South  African Constitu tional Assembly (visited Mar. 5, 1998)
<h tt p://www .con-
stit ution .org.za>.
77. S ee Som e Facts About the Working Draft of th e New Constit ut ion , su pra no t e
75.
78. S ee Debbie B udle nde r & Da vid Eve ra tt , Execu ti ve Summ ary , Eva lua t ing  the
Consti tutional Assembly: National Survey Results (visited  Mar . 5, 1998)
<ht tp://www.constit ut ion.org.za/cas e1546.h tm l> (discussin g a  n a t ional su rvey find ing
tha t  the m ajority of South Africans were awa re of the C on s t it u t iona l Assembly and
i t s wor k).
79. S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . § 15(1) (1996) (“Ever yone  ha s t he  rig ht  to fr eed om of
conscience, re ligi on , t ho ug ht , be lie f an d op in ion .”).
80. S ee id . § 9(3) (“ The s ta te m ay n ot un fairly discr imin at e dire ctly or ind i r ec t ly
par ties  were m em bers of t he CA.73 The CA did a va r iet y of
th ings in  order  to include  the publ ic in  the negotiation pr ocess
and ma ke t he F ina l Const itu tion  a t ru ly dem ocrat ic
inst rumen t. I t  r eleased  a  work ing  dra ft  of t he  cons t it u t ion  to
the public in October, 1995, and CA requ ested an d received
submiss ions from t he  pu blic concern ing t he  work ing d r a ft . It
also publish ed a n ewslett er,  Constitutional Ta lk .74 Fur the r , the
CA comm it ted  it se lf t o using pla in  la ngu age in  the con st it u t ion
because  ci t izens  have  a  “r igh t  t o under s t and the  Cons t it u t ion
un der  wh ich t he y live.”75 To further incorpora te t he  pub li c i nto
discussions, th e CA set  up  a u seful a nd simple int ern et
homepa ge tha t in clude s CA m inu te s a nd  re port s, dr aft  te xts , a
searchable da taba se  conta in in g m any subm issions,  is su es  of
Constitutional Talk , an d m edia  st at em en ts  re lea sed  by th e
CA. 76 The CA also established a Talk-Line to provide
in forma t ion  by te lephone; the p ublic could leave recorded
mess ages  with  their  idea s r ega rding t he con st it u t ion .77 A
sur vey sh owed t ha t effort s t o involve th e pu blic in t he
negot iat ions we re s uccessfu l.78
The F ina l Cons t it u t ion pr otect s fre edom  of religion t hr ough
a  var ie ty of p rov is ions  s imi la r  to the  In te r im Cons t itu t ion ,
includ ing a  genera l fr eedom of r eligion claus e,79 a clause
forbiddin g discr im in a t ion  on the basi s of r eli gion ,80 a  clause
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against  an yone on on e or m ore gr ound s, includ ing .  . . religion, conscience,
belief . . . . ”).
81. S ee id . § 15(2) (“Reli giou s obs er van ces m ay b e con du cte d a t s ta te  or
stat e-aided institu tions provided that —(a) those observ a n ces follow rules  ma de by th e
appropr ia t e pu blic a ut hor it ies ; (b) t he y a re  cond uct ed on a n e qu it ab le b as is; a nd  (c)
a t t endance at  th em  is fr ee  an d vol un ta ry .”).
82. S ee id . sched. 2 (st at ing t ha t in divid u a ls t ak in g t he  oat h of office  can  ma ke
a  solemn  affirma tion r at her  th an  an  oath , th us om it ting th e final words “[s]o help me
God ”).
83. S ee id . § 18 (“E ver yon e h as  th e r igh t t o fr ee dom  of as soci at ion .”).
84. S ee id . § 31(1 ) (“Per son s be lon gin g t o a cu l t u ral, re ligious or lin guist ic
communi ty ma y not be  denie d th e righ t, wit h oth er m embe rs of th eir comm un ity,
to— (a)  en joy their cultu re, pra ctise their  religion and u se th eir lan guage; an d (b)
form , join an d ma int ain  cultu ra l, religious a nd lin guist ic ass ociations a nd ot her  organ s
of civil  soci et y.”).
85. S ee id . § 8(1 ) (“Th e Bil l of Righ ts  ap plie s t o al l law  and b inds  the
legislature,  t he  execu t ive, t he judiciary, and all organs of stat e.”). “Organs of stat e”
a re defin ed i n s ect ion 2 39 of t he  Fi na l Con st itu tion  as
any dep ar tm en t of s ta te  or a dm ini st ra tion  [oth er  t h an ju dicia l officer s or
cour t s ] in  th e n at ion al , pr ovin cia l or  loca l sp he re  of gove rn me nt ; an d (b) a ny
o ther  fun ction ar y or i ns tit ut ion—(i) e xer cisin g a p ower  or  perform ing a
fun ction  in terms of the Const itu tion or  a pr ovincial const itu tion; or (ii)
exe rci sing a p ub lic po wer  or p er form in g a  pu blic fun ction  in  t erms  of  any
leg is la t ion .
Id . § 239.
86. Id . § 8(2) (“A provisi on o f the Bill of Right s bind s na tu ra l an d jur istic
per s on s if, and  to t he  ext en t t ha t, i t is  ap plica ble,  ta kin g in to a ccoun t t he  na tu re  of
the ri gh t a nd  of an y du ty  im pos ed  by t he  ri gh t. ”).
87. S ee De Vos v. Dir  Rin gskommissie van die Ring van die N.G. Kerk
Bloemfont ein,  1952 (2) SA 83, 84, 93 (O). In South  Africa, chur ches h ave  lega l
pe r sona li t y if th eir  dom estic ar ticles of as sociat ion or con stit ut ion so in dicat e. S ee van
der  Vyver, supra  note 37, at  180-81.
88. S. AF R . CO N S T . § 8(4) (199 6).
discuss ing re ligious  educa t ion  (includin g religious observa nces
a t  stat e institutions or  schools),81 a  pr ovis ion  de a lin g wi th  oa ths
con t r a ry to religious beliefs,82 and a  freedom  of ass ocia t ion
clause.83 The F ina l Const itution also includes a clause
p r ot e ct i n g cu l t u r a l com m u n i ties, in cludin g rel igiou s
com m u n ities. 84 Th e r igh t s in  thes e cla use s b in d t he or ga ns of
sta te. 85 They also bind natu r a l  a nd  ju r is t ic per sons  “i f,  and  to
the exte nt  th at , it is  ap plicab le, ta kin g t o accoun t t he n at ur e of
the r igh t  and  of any du ty imposed  by th e r ight .”86 Ju r i s ti c
persons, such as churches,87 “ar e en t it l ed  to the  r igh t s in  the
Bill of Rights t o the exten t r equired  by the n a tu re  of t he  r ight s
an d t he  jur ist ic per sons .”88
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89. S ee id . § 36 (discussing th e circumsta nces wh e n  legis lat ion m ay v iola te  or
limit  th e a pp lica ti on  of fun da me nt al  ri gh ts ).
90. S ee id . § 37 (stat ing wh en a  sta te of eme rgen cy can lim it t he  ap plica tion  of
fundamenta l rights).
91. Id . § 36(1) (emph asis  ad de d).
92. Id . § 37(1 ).
93. S ee id . § 37(2 )(b).
94. S ee id . § 37(4 ).
95. S ee id . §§ 37 (4)-(5) (s ta tin g t ha t t he  rig ht s of eq ua lit y (bu t n ot r eligi ous
equ al it y), huma n dignity, life, freedom and security of the person, slavery,  servitude
a n d force d la bor , ch ildr en , a nd  ar re st ed,  det ai ne d a nd  accu se d p er son s ca nn o t  be
The app lica t ion  of sect ion  15 of the F in a l Con st it u t ion  may
be limit ed by t he gen era l lim i tations clause89 or by t he
declar at ion of a st at e of emer gen cy.90 The genera l lim it a t ion s
cl ause r eads  in  pa r t :
(1 )
T h e r i gh t s  i n  t he  B ill of Righ ts  m ay  be lim ite d on ly in
t e r m s of la w of gen era l a pp lica tion  t o  t h e e x t en t  t h a t  t h e
lim ita tion  i s  reasonable  an d ju st i f iable  in  a n  op en  a n d
dem ocrat ic socie t y  b a se d  on  h u m a n  d ign i t y ,  eq u a l i t y a n d
freed om , ta king in to account  a l l  re leva nt  factors  includ ing—
(a ) t h e  n a t u r e  o f t h e  r i gh t ;
(b ) th e im por ta n ce of th e p u rp ose  of th e lim ita tion ;
(c) th e n at u re  an d e xt en t of t h e lim ita tion ;
(d) t h e r e la t ion  be tween  the  l imi t a t ion  an d  i t s  pu rp ose ;
a n d
(e) l e s s  r e s t r i c t ive  mea ns  to  ach ieve  the  pu rpose .91
This  sect ion  a l so s ta tes  no l aw may limi t a ny right  ent ren ched
in the bill  of rights.
The bill of r ights m ay also be limited u nder  section 37 by
the decla ra t i on  of a  st a te of emer gen cy. A s ta te of emer gen cy
ca n  be  decla red  by a n  act  of Pa r lia men t  wh en  “th e li fe of t he
na t ion  is t hr ea te ne d . . . an d t he  decla ra tion  is n ecess ar y to
restore pea ce an d ord er .”92 A s ta te of emergency  can  l ast  no
more than  twenty-one days unless ext en de d b y s ixt y per cen t  of
the Assembly.93 Th e s t a te of emer gen cy ca n  only d er oga te fr om
the bill of  r ights to t he  exte nt  st rict ly re qu ire d by t he
em er gen cy and t he le gis la t ion  de roga t in g fr om the b ill  of r i gh t s
cannot  violate t he Repu blic’s obligat ions un der in ter n a t iona l
law  applicable to stat es of em er gen cy.94 Addit iona lly, th e
leg is la t ion  cannot  indemni fy  the s t a te nor  any  person ,  and
cannot  deroga te from a  l ist  of right s (which  does n ot inclu de
section 15, freedom of religion, th ought a nd belief ).95
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der ogated  dur ing a  sta te of eme rgen cy, either  in t heir  ent iret y or to a  limite d ext e n t ).
96. Sect ion  9 of the 1996 South African Constitution states:
(1) Everyone is e qu al b efor e t he  law  an d h as  th e r igh t t o equ al p rot ect ion
and benefit of the law.
(2) Equa li ty i ncludes  the ful l and  equal en joymen t  of  al l r i gh t s  and
freedoms. To promote the a chievement of equality, legislative and oth er
measu res  designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons,
disadvant aged by unfair discriminat ion may be tak en.
(3) The state ma y not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against
a n y on e on on e or  mor e gr oun ds , in clu din g r ace , gen der , se x, pr egn an cy,
ma r i ta l stat us, ethn ic or social origin, colour, sexual orienta tion, age,
disab ility, religion, cons cience, belief, cultu re, la ngu age a nd bir th .
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against
anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection  (3) . Na t iona l
legis lat ion  mu st  be e na cte d t o pr eve nt  or p roh ibit  un fair  dis crim ina tion .
(5) Dis crim ina tion  on on e or  mor e of t he  gr oun ds  lis te d in  su bse cti on  (3) is
un fair  un less it  is est ablish ed th at  th e discrim ina tion is fa ir.
97. This  m a y  u nd e rm i n e t h e  a r gu m en t  t ha t  Sou th  Af r ica  has  become  the
strongest democracy in southern  Afr ica a nd  is p oise d t o ta ke  th e le ad  in r eligi ous
fre edom  issues in th e region; however, it un dermin es the a r g u m en t  only slightly. The
s t r ength  of South Africa’s constit ut io n , t h e amoun t o f pub li c pa r t ic ipa t ion  in  i t s
dra fting,  an d t he  ins tit ut ions  est ab lish ed t o main ta in Sou th  Africa’s dem ocracy all
poin t to Sou th  Africa as  th e lea der  in sou th ern  African d emocr acy. F u r t h e r , t he thr ee
re ligious fre edom  cas es d ecide d t hu s fa r b y th e Con st itu tion al C our t  fu r t he r  show the
s t rong prot ection  of religious  freed om in  Sout h Africa. See infra Part  IV.
98. S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . § 8 (19 96).
99. Id . § 9(4).
100. These grou nds  inclu de r ace, gen der , sex, p regn an cy, mar ita l sta tu s, eth nic
or  social origin , color, sexu al or ient at ion, a ge, dis ab ilit y, r eli gion , con scie nce , be lie f,
cu ltu re , lan gua ge, an d bir th . See id.  § 9(3).
101. S ee De Vos v. Dir Rings kommissie van die Ring van  die N.G. Kerk
Bloemfont ein,  1952 (2) SA 83, 84, 93 (O). 
The equa lit y sect ion  in  se ct ion  9 is both  broa d a nd  power ful,
sh ar ply refle ct in g Sou th  Africa ’s m ar re d h ist ory.96 Read
lite ra lly, however , t h is  st rong cla use  can  run  coun t e r  to som e
r igh t s a s socia ted with  freedom of reli gion .97 The  ap plicat ion
section  says natu ral and juristic persons a re b oun d by t he b ill
of r i gh t s  t o t he  ex ten t  it  is  applicable to th em. 98 This
roundabout  lan g u a ge is s hor t cir cuit ed by s ection  9 its elf. “No
person [including ju r i st i c persons ] may  unfa irly dis crim ina te
dir ectly or in dir ectly”99 on  a n y  g round l is t ed  in  su bs ect ion
9(3). 100 Conseq uen tly, a  chu rch , which  is a  ju r i st i c person ,  may
not  d iscr imina te  on  any  of t he  grounds l is t ed  un le ss  t he church
est abli shes  t ha t s uch  discr imin at ion is fair .101 Th is  pr ovis ion
may p rove oner ous to churches with  t r ad it ions  or  doct r ines  tha t
differen tia te  between people on such grounds. Al though  such  a
church  ha s t he opp ort un ity t o prove its  discr imin at ion is fair ,
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102. This  includes for exa mple, Rom an  Cat holicism, m an y other  Chr istia n
religions, Ju daism , Islam , African t ra ditiona l religions , an d Sikh ism .  S ee GE N D E R A N D
RELIGION  (William H.  Sw at os, J r.  ed ., 1 993 ); RELIGION AND WO M E N  (Arvind  Sh a r m a
ed. 1994 ); WO M E N I N  WORLD RE L I G IO N S (Arv in d S ha rm a e d.,  198 7).
103. S ee du P lessis , supra  note 18, at  458.
104. S. AF R . CO N S T . § 9(4) (199 6).
read liter ally, t he section says a chur ch is not allowed to
discrimina te,  (for exa mp le, in  h i r ing  suppor t  s t a ff), on  the bas is
of re ligion .  It  i s coun te r -in tu itive to p reven t  a  church  from
req uir ing its a gents  or functionar ies to be mem ber s of it s
congrega t ion  because  su ch  a  requ ir em en t  wou ld  be  a  viola t ion
of some  human  r ight .
More contr oversia l would be  th e ap plica t ion  of section 9 to
issues  su r rounding the  gende r  of cler gy. M any r eli gion s r es t r ict
cler ica l roles  by sex. 102 Str ictly read, section 9 would declar e
tha t  pr act ice i lle ga l in  Sou t h  Afr ica. Some religions ma y also
rest r ict  cler ica l du t ie s t o persons of a particular m arital sta tus.
Such  r est rict ions m ay be  conside re d “fair,” an d t he re fore lega l
un der  sections 9(3) an d (4), but  section  9(5) bu rde ns t he ch urch
with  proving in court  that  these restrictions ar e fair . Th is  k ind
of legal har assm ent is n ot wha t is  en vis aged  by t he fr eedom  of
religion pr ovisions in section 15.
Accordin g to Du  Ples si s,  du r in g t he wr it in g of the I n t er im
Con st it u t ion , t he  grea t es t  nu m b er  of subm issions ma de by
reli giou s commu nit ies concern ed t he gu ar an tee  of equalit y
based  on sexual orien t a t ion .103 Sect ion 9 s eem s t o imply t ha t a
church , a s  a  ju r is t ic pe r son , wou ld  not  be  able  to rem ove fr om
its  membersh ip a  per son w ho is a  hom osexu al, a lth ough
homosexua l ity may  be  a  se r ious s in  accord ing to th e doctr ine of
tha t  church ,  unless  the church  can  show such  dis cr imina t ion  i s
fair . Th is  could  be  an  unaccep table  in t rusion  in to the d oct r ina l
a ffa i r s of such  a  church .
Pr obably the best way to address th ese problems would be
th rough the  opera t ion  of the second s en ten ce of se ct ion  9(4):
“Nat iona l legisla tion  mu st  be en act ed t o preven t or  pr ohibit
unfa i r discr imin at ion.”104 By conscient iously defining wha t
“unfa i r” me an s in  th e r eligious  conte xt, t he  legisla tive  b ranch
can elimina te t his pr oblem.
In  South  African common la w, the p rovis ion s  of a  church’s
cons t it u t ion  legally govern  a chu rch ’s r elat ionsh ip wit h it s
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105. S ee van  der  Vyver, supra  note 37, at  183.
106. S ee id . at 184.
107. S ee i d .
108. S ee id ., quot ing Theron  v. Ring van Wellington van  die NG Sendin gkerk ,
1976 (2) SA 1 , 15 , 20 -23 (A).
109. S ee id . at 186.
110. S ee supra  note 7.
members.105 The r elat ionsh ip  be tween  the  church  and  the
individual members is con t ractua l ;106 t hus , e ithe r  pa r ty  may
recover for br each . An ecclesias tica l tr ibun al m us t a dh ere  to its
dut ies un der t he constit ut ion, as well as t o principles of na tu ra l
justice.107 These principles have been in ter pret ed to mea n t he
t r ibuna l mus t  actua lly cons ider  t he  mat t e r  a t  h a n d,  not  act
ultra  vires, act  in  good fait h, a nd  act  re as ona bly.108 Civ il cou r t s
may revi ew the d ecis ion s of e cclesiast i ca l  t r ibuna ls  to the
extent  they viola te the  cons t itu t ion  or  the  pr inciples  of na tu ra l
justice, pa rt icular ly wher e th e tr ibun al h as  exceeded it s
jur isdict ion or h as  oper at ed n egligen tly or  ma liciously.109
III. RE L I G I O U S  F R E E D O M  CL AU S E S  I N  SO U T H E R N  AFR ICAN
CO N S T IT U T IO N S
 S ou t h  Afr ica  is n ot t he on ly sout her n African  na tion  t h a t
has ra tified  a n ew const itu tion  re cent ly.110 This P a r t  discusses
reli giou s freedom  cla use s in  a ll s outhe r n  Afr ican  cons t itu t ions
and shows how these othe r  const i t ut ions  protect  fr eedom of
reli gion  s imi la r ly to the  Sou th  Afr ican  Cons t itu t ion .  Such
similar ities su ggest  the ease  wit h  wh ich  other  sou ther n  Afr ica n
count ries  could follow Sout h African  const itu tion al cas e law .
Sou the rn African nations’ constitut ions con ta in  severa l
clauses  directly implicatin g religious libert ies, covering: genera l
freedom  of religion, discrimin at ion on the bas is of reli gion ,
reli giou s edu cat ion (inclu din g re ligious observances at stat e
inst i tu t ions or  s chool s),  and  oa ths  con t r a ry to r eligious beliefs.
A cla use  tha t  men t ion s G od in  a  pr ea mble  or  pos ta m ble is a
specia l t ype of cl ause tha t  im p li ca t es r eligious liber ties  an d is
cu r ren tly a n  issue for several southern African nations.
Addit iona lly, some sou t hern  African cons tit ut ions cont ain
addit ion a l cla use s r ela t in g t o reli gion  (for  exa mple, p rovis ion s
protect ing rights of pers ons  to p ract i ce  thei r  cu l tu re,  including
reli giou s cult u re; ex ten ding fr eedom  of as socia t ion ; and
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111. ZI M B. CO N S T . § 19(1); cf. BOTS . CO N S T . § 11(1 ); SWAZ . CO N S T . § 11(1 ); ZAMBIA
CO N S T . § 19(1 ).
112. S. AF R . CO N S T . § 15(1) (199 6);  cf. MALAWI CO N S T . § 33; NAMIB. CO N S T .
§ 21(1 )(c); S. AF R . CO N S T . § 14(1) (199 3).  Leso tho’s  Cons t i tu t ion  is  a  hybr id: it  bot h
entitles  pers ons t o and  forbids hin dra nce of freedom of relig ion. S ee LE S O TH O CO N S T .
§ 13(1 ).
discuss ing wh et he r r eligious  righ ts  can  be l im it ed  or  de roga ted ).
A. Gen era l Freed om  of R eligion  Clau ses
 Each  southern African consti tut ion contains a  genera l
freedom  of reli gion  cla use . Over  ha lf of t he cou nt r ies de fine  the
righ t  negat ively. For  exa mple, t he Zim ba bwea n  Con st it u t ion
reads:
Excep t  w i th  h i s  own  consen t  o r  by  way  o f pa ren ta l  d i sc ip l ine ,
no  pe r son  sha l l  be  h inde r ed  in  the  en joymen t  of his  f r e ed o m  o f
consc ience , th at  is t o sa y, fr ee dom  of th ou gh t a n d of r elig ion ,
f r e ed o m  to ch an ge h is r elig ion  or b e li e f,  and  f r eedom,  whe th e r
al on e  or in  com m u n i t y w it h  ot h e rs , a n d  w h et h e r in  p u b lic or  in
p r iva t e ,  t o m a n i fe s t a n d  p r op a g a te  h i s  r e l ig ion  o r  be l ie f
th r ough  worsh ip ,  t each ing ,  p rac t i ce  and  obse rvance .111
The ot h e r count ries ’ const itu tion s defin e th e righ t p ositively
(and more con cisely): “Ever yon e h as t he r igh t  to freedom  of
conscien ce, religion , th ough t, be lief an d opin ion.”112
The first t ype of genera l reli giou s fr eedom  claus e spe cifically
defines th e scope of religiou s liber tie s t o includ e t he  righ t t o
change, pr act ice, an d sh ar e one’s r eligiou s beliefs. It  also
provides for one t o consent  to a der ogation of one’s rel igious
rights, as well as for paren ts to limit their children’s religious
r igh t s thr ough discipline. These limitat ion aspects a re a bsent
fr om  the s econd t ype of clause . The a bsen ce of th ese a spect s in
t h e second t ype of clause, however, does not m ean  th at  th e
scop e of religious libert ies (or, a lt er na t ive ly,  of the limit a t ion s
to those  liber t ies ) is m ore n ar row. I n  fact ,  t h e  pr esence  of such
language in the constitut ions of neighbors could be persua sive
to t h e cour t s  in  coun t r i es  us ing  the second  type of genera l
clause, an d t hey m ay we ll int erp ret  th eir  constitut ion to include
th e specifics ment ioned in th e first claus e.
Another  sign ifica n t  di ffer en ce bet ween  the t wo t ypes  of
clauses  is how the right is phra sed: nega t ive ly in  the fir st  (no
one’s freedom  of re ligion can  be hin der ed) an d posit ively in t he
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 2\ F I N A L \ B L A- F IN . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
532 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
113. Tha t th es e r igh ts  can not  be v iola te d is  cle a r from  th e “ap plica tion ” sect ions
of the bills of rights of those countr ies using the second type  of clause. These clau ses
s t a t e tha t  the ri gh ts  in t he  bills  of rig ht s a re  to b e u ph eld  (an d by i mp lica tion , not
violated) by th e govern men t. S ee, e.g., S. AF R . CO N S T . § 8 (199 6).  The religion clause,
read with the a pplication  clause , esta blishes  th at  th e expr essly gr an ted r ight  to
re ligious freedom cannot be hinder ed; there fore,  the second type of religion clause
described above is quite like the first.
114. S ee S v. Solberg, 1997 SACLR LEXIS 30, *99  (CC Oct . 6, 19 97); i d . at *115
(O’Regan , J ., dis sen tin g); i d . at  *177  (Sa chs , J ., con cur ri ng ).
115. S ee In re Ch ik we che , 19 95 (4 ) 284  (Zim b.).
116. S ee BOTS . CO N S T . § 15(3) (“In  th is section , th e express ion ‘discrim ina tory’
means affording differe nt  tr eat men t t o different  pers ons, a tt ribu ta ble wholly or m ain ly
to th eir  re sp ect ive d es cri pt ion s by  ra ce, t ri be,  pla ce of or igin , poli ti cal  opin ions , color
or  cre ed w he re by pe rs ons  of one s uch  des crip tion  are su bject ed t o dis ab ilit ies  or
r e s t r ic t ions to w hich  per son s of a not he r s uch  des crip tion  ar e n ot m ade su bjec t  or  a r e
accorded  privileges or advantages which are n ot accorded to persons o f ano the r  such
de scr ipt ion .”); see als o LE S O TH O CO N S T . § 18(3) (s a m e wor din g);  MALAWI CO N S T . § 20
(similar  wor din g); NAMIB. CO N S T . § 10 (similar  wor din g); S. AF R . CO N S T . § 9 (1996)
(s a m e wor din g); S. AF R . CO N S T . § 8 (1993) (similar  wor din g); SWAZ . CO N ST . § 15 (s a m e
wor din g); ZAMBI A CO N S T . § 23 (s a m e wor din g); ZI M B. CO N S T . § 23 (s a m e wor din g).
second (one  has the  r ight  to fre edom  of religion). Text ua lly, th e
two have  di ffe ren t  mea n in gs ; one a ffir mat ive ly gr an t s r eli giou s
freedom , and app a r en t ly by im pl ica t ion , for bid s h in dr ance of
tha t  freedom ,113 while the other prohibits th e hindrance of
freedom  of religion, which  mu st  be a r igh t  to wh ich one is
ent itled in  ord er  t o be  h in de red . P ract ica lly , h owever , cou r t s
may cons t rue,  and indeed  have  a lready constr ued the clauses
similar ly—indeed  th e effects, des pit e  t h e word ing,  ar e
indis t inguish able .  For ins ta nce,  the S ou t h  Afr ica n
Cons t itu t iona l Court  recent ly inter p r eted  it s gen er a l r eli giou s
freedom  claus e (th e second t ype) to mean t ha t one cann ot be
coerced into a ct i n g cont ra ry t o one ’s r eligiou s beli efs  and t ha t
evide nce of coercion is  a per se in t rusion  on reli giou s fr eedom .114
This  inter pret at ion was iden tical to a Zimbabwe S upr eme
Cou r t  case,  which  a fte r  cons t ru ing  the first  t ype of clause,
det erm ined  th at  coercion res ult s in  a  violation of one’s reli giou s
liberties.115 This is th e sam e inter pret at ion, despite t he
di ffer en t  dict ion  in  the con st it u t ion a l provis ion s.
B. Discr im in at ion  on th e Bas is  of R eligion
 In  ad dit ion t o t h e  ge n era l p rot ect ion  of fr eedom of reli gion ,
each  sou thern  Afr ican  cons t itu t ion  forb ids  di scr imina t ion  on
the basis of religion or creed.116 While the phra sing of these
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117. Compare S. AF R . CO N S T . § 8(2) (1 993 ) (“No pers on sh all be u nfair ly
dis cr i m in a t ed aga inst , direct ly or indir ectly . . . , on one or  more  of the following
grounds . . . [includin g] religion  . . . .”), with  NAMIB. CO N S T . § 10(2) (“N o persons  may
be discrim ina ted  aga inst  on th e grou nds  of . . . religion . .  . .”), and LE S O TH O CO N S T .
§ 18(3) (“ ‘[D]iscrimina tory’ me an s a ffordi ng  differ en t t re at me nt  to d iffer en t p er son s
a t t r ibu table wh olly or  m ai nl y t o th eir  re sp ect ive  de scr ipt ion s b y . . .  re ligi on  . . . . ”),
and MALAWI CO N S T . § 20(1) (“Discrimin a tion of persons in any form is prohibited and
all  p e r sons are, under any law, guaranteed equal and effective protection against
dis crim ina tion  on  gr ou nd s of . .  . r eli gion  . . . . ”).
118. S ee BOTS . CO N S T . § 15(3) (“ ‘[D]iscriminatory’ means affording different
t r ea tmen t  to differen t per sons, a tt ribu ta ble wholly or m ain ly to th eir r espect ive
desc r ip t ions by [,in te r a lia ,] cre ed .  . . .”); SWAZ . CO N S T . § 15(3) (sa me  wor din g);
ZAMBIA CO N S T . § 23(3) (sa me  wor din g); ZI M B. CO N S T . § 23(3 ) (sim ila r w or din g).
119. Attorney-General  v. D ow, 1 992  SAC LR L EXI S 7 , *71  (Bot s. J ul y 3,  199 2).
120. S ee id . a t  *70-*71 ( “I  do no t  th ink  that  t he  fr amers  of  the  Cons t it u t ion
intended  to declare in 196 6  t h a t  a ll potentia lly vulnerable gr oups or classes wh o
would  be affected for a ll time  by discrim ina tory t r e a t m en t  have been  iden t if ied  and
ment ioned in  th e d efin it ion  in  se cti on  15(3 ) [of th e Bo ts wa na  Con st it ut ion ]. I  d o n ot
th ink th at  th ey int ende d to decla re t ha t t he cat egories m ent ion e d  in  th at  defin iti on
were fore ver  closed. In t he n at ur e of thin gs, as fa r-sight ed people t ryin g to look int o
the futu re, t hey wou ld ha ve contem plat ed th at  with  th e pas sage of tim e not  only th e
groups or classes which had caused concern at  th e t im e of wr iti ng  th e Con st itu tion
bu t oth er  gr oup s or  clas ses  ne edi ng  pr ote ction  wou ld a ri se.  Th e ca te gor ies  migh t  g row
or  chan ge. In t ha t sen se, th e classe s or gr oups it emis ed in t he definit ion would be,
and in my opinion, are by way of example of what th e framer s of th e Con st itu tion
though t  worth mentioning as potentially some of the most likely ar eas of possible
d iscr imina t ion . I a m for ti fied  in  th is v iew  by t he  fact  th at  other  classes or groups
with  re spe ct t o wh ich d iscr im ina tion  wou ld be  un jus t  and  inhuman  and  wh ich ,
ther efore,  shou ld ha ve been  include d in t he de finition we re n ot. . . . Argua bly religion
is diffe re nt  from c re ed , bu t a lt ho ug h cr ee d is  me nt ion ed , r eli gion  is n ot. ”).
p r ovis ion s is slightly differen t, th e core concept is clear: one
may n ot  be  discr im in a ted  aga in st  ba se d on  reli gion .
One ma jor difference am ong the clau ses is whet her
pr otection  from d iscr im i na t ion is based on r eligion or creed.
Four  count r ies  (Na mibi a , Le sot ho, Ma la wi, a nd S out h  Afr ica )
preven t  discrimination against rel igi on .117 The other  coun tr ies
prot ect  one  from d iscr imina t ion  based on  creed .118 No sou the rn
Afr ica n  cour t h as defined “creed,” alth ough Botswana ’s highest
cour t , th e Appea l Cour t, h as  men tion ed in  dicta  th at  “religion  is
[ar gua bly] di ffer en t  from creed.”1 19 However , t he poin t  of th e
dicta  was n ot th at  creed should be pr otected un der t he
Botswana  discr imina t ion  cla use  wh ile  reli gion  wa s n ot
protected, bu t  tha t  eve n  though  reli gion  wa s n ot  sp ecifically
men t ioned, it m ight  never th eless  be conside red  a clas s
protected from d iscrimina tion bas ed on th e clause.120
The absen ce of “religion” from t he classes  protect ed by t he
discr imin a t ion  claus es of Botswa na , Swa zilan d, Zam bia a nd
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121. S ee J aza iri v. O n tar io [1997] 146 D.L.R. (4th) 297, 307 (Can .) (quoting
de fin it i ons from  Bla ck s’s Law Dictionary, Hou gh ton  Mi ffli n C an ad ian  Dict ion ary  of
the En gli sh  L angu age, Webster’s New Int ernational Dictionary , Oxford English
Dictionary , Webster’s Ninth  N ew  Collegiate Dictionary, and th e New S horter Oxford
Dictionary  on H ist orica l Pr in cipl es).
122. S ee Shuchter v. Division on Civil Rights,  285 A.2d 42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1971); Cumm ings v. Weinfeld, 30 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct . 1941); Rasm uss en v.
Glass, 498 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Riste v. Eastern  Wash. Bible Camp,
Inc.,  605  P. 2d  129 4 (Wa sh . Ct . App . 19 80); Au gust ine v.  Ant i-Defa ma tion  Lea gu e of
B’Nai B’Rith , 249  N.W .2d 5 47 (Wis . 197 7). It  sh oul d be noted  that in each of these
cases “c reed” was  be ing  in t e rp ret ed  in  the  con tex t  of  a s t a t e s t a tu t e and  not  a
cons tit ut ion,  and  in  some  of  the  cases s t a t e  legi sl a t ive in te n t  was e xam ined in
reach ing th e d efin it ion . St ill,  th e cou rt s’ defi ni ti on s of creed a re  consi st en t  wi th
dict iona ry  definitions.
123. S ee Jazairi , 146 D.L.R. (4th) at  307-08.
124. S ee supra  notes 117-118.
Zimba bwe should n ot mea n, however, th at  one could  be
discrimina ted  aga ins t  on  the basis of religion in these count ries.
A var iety of dict i on a r ies de fine cree d a lmost  exclusively in
t e rms of re ligious beli efs .121 Five sta t e cour t s  in  t he  Un i ted
Stat es,122 a s we ll a s a t  lea st  one Canadian  cour t ,123 ha ve defined
creed st r ict ly in  ter ms of r eli giou s b eli ef. T he cou r t s of
Botswana , Swazilan d, Zambia a nd Zimba bwe m ight  define
creed mor e br oadly t ha n t he se s our ces (i.e., to include p olitical,
socia l or economic beliefs), but sout her n  Afr ican  cour t s  would
be ha rd p res sed  to exclude  r eli giou s b eli ef fr om any defin it ion  of
creed. So while th e clauses differ in pr otecting creed versu s
religion  from d iscr imina t ion ,124 once again, in pr actice the
t e rms could be int erpr eted sim ilarly, or at  least  to include th e
othe r .
C. Religious Ed ucation
 Sou the rn Africa n  constitut ions conta in two types of clauses
re la t ing to religious e du ca t ion : fir st , t he con st it u t ion s d iscuss
the r igh t  for  r e ligious  denomina t ions  to e st ablish  reli giou s
sch ools  and t o pr ovid e r eli giou s e du ca t ion  a t  thos e  s ch ools, a nd
second, they address compulsor y  r eligious education at st ate
schools.
The sou th ern  African const itut ions vary in t heir t rea tm ent
of the r igh t  to es tabli sh  reli giou s s chools . T h r ee countries’
cons t itu t ion s expressly gran t religions the r ight to establish
and mainta in religious schools at th eir own expense; these
cons t it u t ions fu rt her  declare t ha t su ch religions will not be
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125. S ee BOTS . CO N S T . § 11(2) (“Every  re l ig ious communi ty  sha l l be  en t i t led , a t
i t s own expense, to establish and m aintain places of education and to  m anage any
pla ce of educat ion which  it wh olly ma in tain s; and n o such commun ity sha ll be
prevented  from providing religious instru ction for per sons of th at  commu nit y in th e
course  of any edu cation  provided  at  an y place of educa tion wh ich it wh olly main ta ins
or  in  th e cou rs e of a ny  ed uca ti on  wh ich  it  oth er wis e p ro vid es .”); LESOTHO CO N S T .
§ 13(2) (s a m e); SWAZI . CO N S T . § 11(2) (s a m e).
126. ZI M B. CO N S T . § 19(3) (“N o religious community sha ll be prevented from
making provision for  th e giv ing  by pe rs ons  law full y in  Zimb ab we of r eligi ous
ins tr uct ion  to  pe r sons  of  tha t  community  in  the course  of any education pr ovided by
tha t  communi ty,  whe the r  or  no t t ha t  communi ty  is  in  receip t  of  any subsidy,  gran t
or  o ther  fo rm of  financia l a s s is t ance  from th e Sta te.”); see ZAMBIA CO N S T . § 19(3)
(similar  wor din g). Wit h r es pect  to  the expen se  qu es ti on,  Zim ba bwe  an d Za mb ia  can
bene fit f rom a  Sou th  Afr i can  Cons t it u t iona l Cou rt  cas e r uli ng  th at  th e cost  of
reli giously  b a sed sch ools mu st b e pa id by t he r eligious  orga niza tion . S ee In re D ispu te
Concern ing the Cons titu tionality of Certa in Pr ovisions of the Gau ten g Sch ool
Ed uca tion  Bill of 19 95, 1 996 (3 ) SA 165  (CC); infra  Par t IV.B.
127. S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . § 29(3) (1996) (“Ever yone  has  the  righ t  t o e s t abl ish  and
main ta in , at their own expense, independent educational instit ut ions  th at —(a) do n ot
d iscr imina te on t he  ba sis  of ra ce; (b) a re  re gist er ed w ith  th e st at e; a nd  (c) ma int ain
standa rds  tha t ar e n o t  in feri or t o st an da rd s a t com pa ra ble p ub lic ed uca tion al
in st it ut ion s.”);  see also MALAWI CO N S T . 25(3 ); NAMIB. CO N S T . § 20(4 ).
preven ted  from providing religious inst ru ction to the st uden ts
of these schools.125 Two othe r cons tit u t ions s t a t e t ha t  a
“religiou s communit y” ma y provid e r eli giou s e du ca t ion  to
s tuden t s “in  the course of any  education provided by t ha t
community ,” but do not grant  religions a  spe cific righ t t o
establish such  school s (perhaps because su ch a r ight is imp lied
in  the cla use ) or s ay wh et her  the r eligiou s com munit y is  to fun d
such  sch ools  (also, becau se su ch a n obligat ion is im plied in  th e
cla use ).126 Th ree  othe r  const it u t ion s a llow  “an y per son ” or
“everyone” (includin g, presu m ably , r eligiou s d en omin a t ion s) t o
establish p r ivate schools at their expense if the schools are
regis te r e d with  the s t a te a nd m ain ta in  governmen t  ed uca t ion
stan dards. 127 However , t hes e p rovis ion s d o not  discu ss  whet her
a  religious commu nity providing such education is entitled to
provide re ligious  educa t ion  in the school, and in this way these
prov is ions ar e facially more n ar row th an  th ose i n  ot h er
constitut ions.
Sou the rn Afr ica n  const i t u tion s a lso discu ss  compu lsory
reli giou s educat ion or observa nces in st at e-r u n  schools. While
the Na mibia n a nd  Mala wian  const itu tion s cont ain  no refe ren ce
to re ligious e du cat ion or obs er van ces in  st at e-ru n s chools, m ost
of the ot her  na t ion s’ const it u t ion s r eli eve  a  st ude nt  from  s u ch
e du ca t ion , as  well a s from  a r eligious  cerem ony or obs er van ce,
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128. S ee BOTS . CO N S T . § 11(3) (“Except with his own consen t  (or, if h e is  a m inor ,
the cons en t of h is gu ar dia n) n o per son  at te nd ing  an y pla ce of ed uca tion  sh all be
required  to r eceiv e r eligi ous  ins tr uct ion or  to t ak e pa rt  in or  at te nd  an y r eligi ous
cer em ony  or ob ser van ce if t ha t in st ru ction , cer em ony  or ob ser van ce r ela te s t o a
re ligion  oth er  th an  hi s ow n. ”); LESOTHO CO N S T . § 13(3) (sa m e wor din g); SWAZI . CO N S T .
§ 11(3) (similar  wor din g); ZAMBI A CO N S T . § 19(2) (s a m e wor din g); ZI M B. CO N S T . § 19(2)
(s a m e wor din g).
129. S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . § 15(2) (1996) (“Religiou s observances may be conducted
a t  stat e or stat e-aided institut ions provided that—(a) those observances follow rules
made  by th e app ropr iat e pub lic aut horit ies; (b) they a re condu cted on a n equ ita ble
basis; and  (c ) a t t endance  a t  them is  free  and volun ta ry.”). For cr iticism of th is
p rov is ion , see supra  text a ccompa nying notes  70-72.
130. S ee, e.g., School Dist . of Abington v. Sch emp p, 374 U.S . 203 (1963) (Bible
re ad in g); En gel  v. Vit al e, 3 70 U .S.  421  (196 2) (voca l pr ay er ).
131. One ambigu ity exists in t he Botswana  and  Zambia  cons t it u t ions  r ega rd ing
re ligiou s edu cat ion a nd  obse rv an ces.  Th ese  cons tit ut ions  excu se s tu den ts  from
a t t endance if the education or observance relates to a differe nt  religion t ha n t heir
own. However , does “religion” in th i s  ca s e  m e a n a fam ily of religion (i.e. Islam  as
opposed to C hr ist ian ity ) or r eligi ous denominat ions (i.e. Roman  Catholic as opposed
to Methodist)? The Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe constitutions make c le a r  tha t
r e fe rences t o re ligion  in t he ir  re ligion  clau se i nclu de r efer en ces t o a r eligi ous
denomina t ion . S ee LESOTHO CO N S T . § 13(7 ) (“References in t his  sect ion t o a r eligi on
sha ll be con st ru ed a s in clu din g r efer en ces  t o a  r eligious den omina tion, a nd cogna te
express ions sh al l be  con st ru ed  acco rd in gly. ”); SWAZI . CO N ST . § 11(6) (s a m e wor din g);
ZI M B. CO N S T . § 19(6) (s a m e wording). Therefore, a Lesoth o, Swazi or Zimbabwea n
cour t  mi gh t con st ru e “re ligion ” in t his  circu ms ta nce  to b e r eligi ous  den omi n a t io n  and
excuse Catholic stu dent s if a Met hodist  past or condu cted a  pra yer m eetin g at  a
school. Th is r es ul t s hou ld a lso occu r i n B ots wa na  an d Za mb ia , de sp it e t he  ab se nce
of th e lan gua ge found in  th e Lesot ho, Zimba bwe an d Swa ziland  constit ut ions. F orcing
one  to at ten d a r eligious ser vice at s chool led by a r eligious den omin ation different
than  one’s own would at least be a  violation of the genera l freedom of religion clauses
in  th e Bots wan an  an d Zam bian  const itu tion s, see BOT S . CO N S T . § 11(1 ); ZAMBI A CO N S T .
§ 19(1 ), in t ha t su ch coercion “hinde r[s] . . . the  enjoyme nt  of his fre edom  of . . .
religion .” Coercing on e to act  contr ar y to one’s own religious  beliefs has been  foun d
to be a n in tr us ion on  re ligiou s fr eed om i n b oth  Sou th  Africa  an d Zimba bwe, see S v.
Solberg,  1997  SACL R LE XIS 3 0, *99  (CC Oct . 6, 19 97); i d . at *115 (O’Rega n, J .,
dis se nt in g); i d . at  *177 (S ach s, J ., con cur ri ng ); In re Chikweche, 1995 (4) SALR 284
(Zim b.),  an d sh ould sim ilar ly resu lt in u nconst itu tiona lity in  Botswa na  an d Zam bia
if one is forced to atten d a religious service in school condu cte d by a  den omi na tion
o ther  t han  one ’s  own .
if it relates to a different r eligion tha n the st udent’s.128 The
Sou th Afr i can  Cons t it u t ion  expands  tha t  con cept t o all stat e-
run  in st it u t ion s (inclu ding schools ) unde r  cer t a in  condi t ion s
(includin g tha t  a t t en da nce is  free  and volun ta ry).129 Sou the rn
Afr ica n  count r ies  cont rove r t ed  United  S ta tes  case l aw
proh ibi t ing religion in  school:130 sou thern  Afr ican  cons t itu t iona l
founder s specifica lly  contem pla ted  the p oss ibi lit y of r eli giou s
edu cat ion in  their  na t ion s’ sch ools  if such  educa t ion  was not
forced on studen ts of other faiths. 131
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132. S ee BOTS . CO N S T . § 11(4) (“N o pe r son  sha ll be com pel led  to t ak e a ny  oat h
wh ich  is con tr ar y to h is r eligi on or  beli ef or  to t ak e an y oat h in  a m an ner  which is
con t r a ry to h is r eli gion  or  bel ief. ”); LESOTHO CO N S T . § 13(4) (s a m e wor din g); SWAZI .
CO N S T . § 11(4) (s a m e wor din g); ZAMBI A CO N S T . § 19(4) (s a m e wor din g); ZI M B. CO N S T .
19(4) (s a m e wor din g).
133. S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . sched. 2 (1996) (giving public officials th e choice of takin g
an  oat h,  in  wh ich  cas e “[s]o help me God” concludes the oath , or making a  solemn
aff irma t ion , in  wh ich  cas e “[s]o h elp  me  God ” is n ot s pok en ).
134. S ee Solberg, 199 7 SAC LR L EXI S a t *9 9 (st at in g t ha t d ir ect  or i nd ir ect
coer cion  was necessary (and thu s a t  lea st  su fficien t) t o est ab lish  a vi olat ion of
r e ligious libe rt y); i d . at *115 (O’Regan, J ., dissenting) (arguin g tha t coercion was
su fficie nt ); i d . at  *177  (Sa chs , J ., con cur ri ng ) (su bm it ti ng  th at  coer cion  wa s s uffi cien t);
see also infra Par t IV.A.3.
135. S ee supra  note 7.
136. S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . prea mble  (1993) (“In h um ble su bmiss ion to Almigh ty
God . . . .); i d . “post am ble” (st at ing  “May G od ble ss ou r  coun t ry” in  six p rominen t
Sou th  Afri can  la ng ua ges ).
137. S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . pr ea mb le (1 996 ) (st ating “May God protect our people”
and “God b les s S ou th  Afri ca” in  six  pr om in en t S ou th  Afri can  la ng ua ges ).
D. Oaths Contrary to Religious Beliefs
 Most  sou the rn Afr i can  cons t it u t ions  protect  one  from tak ing
any oa th  con t r a ry (or  i n a  manner  cont r a r y) to ones ’ reli giou s
beliefs.132 The South  Afr ican  Con st it u t ion  doe s n ot  have such  an
all-in clusive  pr ovision, alt h ou gh  it  doe s a llow  one bein g swor n
in to a  pol it i ca l  offi ce  to t ake  an  a ffi rmat ion  ra the r  than  an oa th ,
which  would requ i re one t o in clude the  words  “[s ]o he lp  me
God.”133 While the tak ing of other oaths is not expressly
prohibited, t ak ing  an  oa th  con t r ary t o one ’s r eligiou s beli efs
would  most likely qua lify as st at e coercion in violat ion of one’s
reli giou s liberties, gua ra nt eed by the gen era l religious libert ies
claus es men t ion ed  above . All of t he ju dges  of the S outh  Afr ica n
Const itu t ion a l Cour t  agree  tha t  such  ou t r igh t  coercion  i s
suffi cien t  t o violate t he gener al  religiou s l ibe r ty pr ovis ion  of th e
South  Afr ican  Cons t itu t ion .134
E. Clau ses  Menti onin g God
 Only  t w o s ou t h e r n  Afr ica n count ries discuss  r eli giou s
th emes  in  pr efa tory lan guage: South  Africa an d Zambia . The
Sou th Afr ica n  In ter im Con st it u t ion 135 ment ions  God  in  both  the
pr eam ble and “postam ble” section (which is titled  “Nat iona l
Un ity and Recon cilia t ion ”).136 The Fin al Const itut ion, rat ified in
1996, ment ions  God  on ly in  the prea mble.137 Even  th is in clusion
led to m uch  deba te  du rin g con s t it u t iona l  dra ft ing about  the
sepa ra tion  of chur ch an d st at e. Noble Peace Prize recipient
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138. S ee Bre nda n Boyle, Tut u Calls for Separation of Church and S tate, REUTERS
N. AM . WIRE , J un e 6, 1995, available in  LEXIS, World Library, Reun a File.
139. S ee Mar ius B osch, S out h A frica n C hr ist ian s Op pose S ecula r Con sti tu tion ,
REUTERS  N. AM . WI R E , Ju ne 14, 1995, available in  LEXIS, World Library, Reun a File.
140. S ee id .
141. S. AF R . CO N S T . pream ble (1996) (stat ing “May God protect our people,”
followed by “God  ble ss  Sou th  Afri ca” in  six  diffe re nt  la ng ua ges ).
142. S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . prea mble  (1983) (“IN HUM BLE SUBM ISSION to
Almight y God . .  . WE  DE CLARE  th at  we . .  . [mu st ] up hol d Chr ist ia n v al ue s . .  . .);
id . § 2 (“ The people of the Repu blic of South Africa acknowledge the sov er e ig n ty  and
gu ida nce  of Alm igh ty  God .”).
143. Van  de r  Vyver , supra  note 37, at  193.
144. S ee F ACTBOOK, supra  note 3, at  469.
145. S ee id .
146. ZAMBIA CO N S T . pream ble. The cont rover sial “Chr istia n n at ion” langu age in
the p reamble was  not  t he most pr oblema t i c amendmen t :  Ch iluba  amended  the
cons t i tu t iona l section r egar ding elect ing t he Zam bian  pres ide n t to include a
requ ir emen t t ha t  a  P residen t ia l  cand ida te ’s  pa ren ts , a s  wel l a s  t he  cand ida te , a r e
Za mbian by birt h or  descen t. See id.  § 34(3)(a)-(b) (“A person sh all be qualified to be
a  candidate for election as P residen t [only] if—(a) he is a citizen of Zambia; (b) bot h
his  pare nts  are Zam bians by birt h or descent  . . . .”). This requi r ement  disqualified
former  president  Kaun da from run ning agains t Chiluba in t he 1996 election because
Kaunda’s pa re nt s we re  bor n in  Ma law i, n ot Za mb ia a s r equ ir ed b y th e con st itu tion .
S ee Ndu lo & Kent , supra  note 7, at  256, 273, 276.
Archbishop Desm ond Tu tu , for exa mp le, called for a  secula r
sta te. 138 However, over 3,000 Chr is t ians  marched on  par li ament
to p rote st  a  p roposa l t o s epa ra t e church  and sta te. 139 Th is  gr oup
included de nomin a t ion s fr om char ismat ic ch urches  to the
cons er vat ive Dutch  Reformed  Church .140 In  the end,  refe ren ce
to God in the preamble was mainta ined.141 Even though these
s t a t em e n t s could be conside re d “religious ,” t h e y a re
inconse que nt ial,  as st at emen ts in  a  p rev ious  Sou th  Afr ican
cons t it u t ion 142 re ferr ing t o G od  h ave been interpreted as “a
confes sion  of fa i th  and a s su ch . . . not  . . . law . . . [,]
consequ en tly a ltoget he r la ck[ing] jur idical r eleva nce.”143
However , in Za m b ia t he sit ua tion is slightly different a nd
much mor e contr oversia l. Zambia r at ified a n ew const itu tion  in
1991 tha t  p rov ided  for  mul t ipa r ty democracy with full an d free
elections.144 In t he 1991 election , Zambia ’s on ly p res iden t  since
independence in 19 64, Ken ne th  Ka un da , was repla ced by
Fr edr ick Chiluba .145 F ive  yea rs la t er , Ch ilu ba  polem ically
am ended  th e const itu tion  to inclu de la ngu age in  th e pr eam ble
making Zam bia a  “Chr is t ian  na t ion” bu t  “upholding the  r igh t of
every pe rson  to en joy t ha t  pe r son ’s fr eedom  of conscien ce or
re ligion.”146 Amendin g  the p rea mble  br ea ched  the s uggest ion  of
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147. S ee Ndulo & Kent ,  supra  n ote 7, a t 277 ; Joe Ch ilaizya , Za m bia -Rel igion :
Knock ing the H alo Off a “Christia n N ation ,” IN T E R P R E S S  SERVICE , Oct . 23, 1995,
available in  LEXIS, Wor ld L ibr ar y, Allwl d F ile; Zambia: Zambian Church and State
on  Colli sion  Cou rse, ALL AF R . P R E S S  SERVICE , J un e 24, 1996 , available in  LEXIS,
World  Libr ar y, Allwld File . 
148. Ndu lo & Ken t, supra  note 7, at  277.
149. S ee Straus,  supra  note 11.
150. S ee supra  notes 142-143.
151. ZAMBIA CO N S T . pream ble.
152. S ee N A M I B. CO N S T . § 19 (“Every  person sha ll be entitled to enjoy, practice,
profess, maint ain an d promote an y culture, langu age, trad ition or religion  sub ject  t o
the term s of this Constitution an d furth er subject to the cond it ion  tha t  t he  r igh t s
protected by this Article do not impinge upon the rights of other s  or  the  na t iona l
in te re st .”); S. AF R . CO N S T . § 31(1) (1996) ( “Pe r sons belon gin g to a  cult ur al,  re ligiou s or
linguis tic communi ty m a y  n ot  be den ied th e righ t, wit h oth er m embe rs of th eir
communi ty, to—(a) enjoy their cultur e, practise their religion and u s e  t h ei r  langua ge;
a  government  cons t itu t iona l  r ecommenda t ion  commiss ion ,  and
it  was contr ar y to the lobbying efforts of man y chur ches.147
Commenta tor s ca ll th e pr oclama tion  in t he p rea mble
“an t i thet i ca l to t he  equ alit y of the  people r ega rd ing t h eir
reli giou s beliefs.”148 It  is a lso da nger ous: H ind us  in Zam bia
ha ve recen tly  been t ar gets of property da ma ge and  hate a cts;149
sta te-recognized Ch r is t ia n it y fu r th er  os t racizes  Hind u
Zambians an d could e ncour age  Chr ist ian s t o furt he r a nt agon ize
H i n dus an d oth er r eligious gr oups . In or der  to pr otect r eligiou s
liberty in Za mb ia, t h e “Chr is t ian  na t ion” l anguage shou ld be
deleted  in a  fu tu re  cons t it u t iona l amendmen t . Al t erna t ively,
Zambian  cour t s  shou ld e ithe r  ignore  the p refa tory  “Chr is t ian
na t ion” l anguage, a s  h a s been  argu ed  in  the S outh  Afr ica n
conte xt, 150 or ensu re special considera tion of religious liber t y  in
light  of the  added  dete rmina t ion  in  t he p rea mble  to “uphold[]
the r igh t  of every per son  to en joy . . .  freedom  of conscien ce or
r eligion,”151 or both . Fu rt her , Chilu ba’s govern men t, in cludin g
the Zambian Parliament (most of wh om belong to Chiluba’s
pol it ica l pa r ty), should n ot use t he pr efatory lan guage t o ju s t ify
passing pr o-Chris tia n legis lat ion th at  violat e s t he r eli giou s
liberties of any Zambia ns—non-Chr istian  or other wise.
F. Ot her Cla uses  Im pl ica ti ng R eligion
 Some sou the rn Afr i can  cons t it u t ions d es cr ibe  other  r i gh t s
relat ed to religion. For instance, in Namibia and Sou t h  Afr ica ,
reli giou s commu nities spe cifica lly  have t he r igh t  to pr act ice
th eir  reli gion .152 Th is  r igh t  wa s p roba bly  in cluded to appease
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 2\ F I N A L \ B L A- F IN . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
540 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
and (b) form, join a nd m ain ta in c u lt u r a l,  religious and linguistic associations and
o ther  or ga ns  of civi l soc iet y.”).
153. Afr ikaner s make up a sm all percentage of South Africans and N amibians.
They are wh ite d e s ce n d a nts of the Du tch set tlers wh o came to South  Africa in 1652,
and ar e usu ally cha ra cterize d by th eir l an gu ag e, Afr ik aa ns  (a d er iva ti ve of D ut ch),
and th eir r eligion (us ua lly Calvin istic). S ee DAVENPORT , supra  note 27, at  19, 20, 30.
It  was th e mostly Afrikan er Na tional Par ty tha t instit uted  apa rt heid  in  Sou th  Africa
in  th e lat e 1940s . S ee id . at 320 -45. As  mi nor ity  comm un iti es a nd  th e de sign er s of
apart heid, Afrik an er s we re  esp ecia lly s en sit ive t o pr ote ct t he ir  cult ur e a nd  re ligion
const itu tiona lly when t he curr ent N amibian a nd South  African constitut ions were
drafted: th us, N am ibi a  Co n stitut ion § 19 and South African Constitution § 31 were
included.
154. S. AF R . CO N S T . § 6(5)(b) (“The  Pa n Sou th  African L an gua ge Boar d mu st . . .
p romote and  ensu re  r e spect  fo r  languages, includin g . . . Arabic, Hebr ew, San skr it
and oth er s u se d for  re ligi ou s p ur pos es .”).
155. BOTS . CO N S T . § 13(1) (“Except with h is own consent, no per son sha ll be
hindered  in t he e njoym ent  of his free dom of as sem bly an d as sociat ion, th at  is t o say,
his  right t o assemble freely an d associate wi th oth er per sons  and  in  pa r t icu la r  t o
form  or  bel on g t o . . . a ss ocia ti on s for  th e p ro te cti on  of hi s in te re st s.”);  see also SWAZI .
CO N S T . § 13(1) (s a m e wor din g); ZAMBI A CO N S T . § 21(1) (s a m e wor din g); ZI M B. CO N S T .
§ 21 (s a m e wor din g).
156. MALAWI CO N S T . § 32(1) (“Ever y per son  sh all  ha ve t he  rig ht  to fr eed om of
as soc ia t ion , which shall include the freedom to form associat ion s.”);  see  LE S O TH O
CO N S T . § 16(1) (similar  wor din g); NAMIB. CO N S T . § 21(1)(e) (similar  wor din g); S. AF R .
CO N S T . § 18 (1996) (“Ever yone  ha s t he  ri gh t t o fr ee dom  of as soci at ion .”).
157. S ee, e.g., BOTS . CO N S T . § 13(1 ).
the Afr ikane r  communit i es  in  both  of t hese  coun t r ie s a ft e r th eir
minor i ty govern men ts chan ged to ma jority black r ule.153
Addit iona lly, the S outh  Afr ica n  const it u t ion a l provis ion  on
language policy requir es a P an  South  African La ngua ge Boa r d
to be esta blished. Th e Boa rd must , among other t asks,
“p romote and  ensu re r e spect  for lan guages  . . . u se d for
religiou s pu rp oses,” such a s Ara bic, Hebr ew a nd  Sa ns kr it. 154
Addit iona lly, a l l sou thern  Afr i can  cons t it u t ions  protect
freedom  of association—a right som e t imes r elied upon by
reli giou s g roups . The way t he r ight  is pr otecte d is s imila r  to the
genera l religious freedom clau ses described  above . Some p rotect
the r igh t  nega t ive ly: “Excep t  wit h  h is  own  conse n t , n o pe rson
sha l l be h in de red  in  the en joym en t  of hi s fr eedom  of assem bly
and as sociat ion . . . .”155 Oth ers define it p ositively: “Every
person sh a ll h ave t he r igh t  to freedom  of ass ocia t ion . . . .”156 In
most sou thern  Afr ican  count rie s, t his  righ t  inclu des  th e r ight  to
form an  associa t ion .157
Another  impor tan t  t ype  of cla use  tha t  a ffect s t he p rotect ion
of religious freedom is t he limit at ions clause found in sout her n
Afr ica n  constitut ions. Limitat ions clauses  con templa te  the
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158. S ee MALAWI CO N S T . § 44(1 )(h);  NAMIB. CO N S T . § 24(3 ).
159. S ee BOTS . CO N S T . § 11(5 ); SWAZI . CO N S T . § 11(5 ); ZAMBI A CO N S T . § 19(5 ); ZI M B.
CO N S T . § 19(5 ). 
160. S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . § 36 (199 6).  Th e In te ri m S out h Afr ican  Con st itu tion ’s
l imi t a t ions clause contained a differen t ,  t wo-tier approach. First,  all limitations had
to be reasonable, justifiable in a democratic society, and nondestruct ive of t he
essen t ia l c on t e n t  of  the  r igh t . S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . § 33(1) (199 3).  Secon d, lim ita tion s
on  cer ta in r igh ts , in clud ing  re ligiou s r igh ts , ha d t o b e  sh o wn  to be ne cessa ry, t hu s
ra i sing th e difficulty of th ese r ight s bein g limit ed. S ee id . However , t he  d if fe ren t
ap pr oach  in the Final Consti t u tion does not mean r eligious right s (and th ose other
r igh t s protected wi th t he t oughe r “necessa ry” sta nda rd u nder  th e Int erim
Cons t it u t ion ) can  be m ore  ea sily  lim ite d u nd er  th e F ina l Con st itu tion . O n e  fa cto r  the
Fina l Constitut ion mentions is “the nat ure of t he right.” S. AF R . CO N S T . § 36(1 )(a)
(199 6).  Reli giou s r igh ts ar e ar gua bly th e first  of the h um an  righ ts, see W. Cole
D u r h a m , J r . , Pers pecti ves on  Rel igiou s Li ber ty: A Comparat ive Framework , in
RE L I G IO U S H U M A N  RI G H T S  IN  GLOBAL P E R S P ECT IVE , supra  no t e 18,  a t  1,  1,  and du r ing
a p a rth eid in Sou th  Africa re ligious r ight s wer e often  violat ed. S ee S v.  So lbe rg, 1997
SACLR LEXIS 30, *139-*48 (CC Oct. 6, 1997) (Sachs, J ., con cur ri ng ); see also infra
Par t  IV.A.3.  Su bse qu en tly , th ey d ese rv e sp ecia l pr ote ction  from li mi t a t ion  unde r  t he
Fina l Con st itu tion  as  th ey d id u nd er  th e In te ri m C ons tit ut ion.
161. S ee S v.  Zum a,  199 5 (2) S A 642  (CC) (fi rs t  Constitut ional Court case). The
Cons t i tu t iona l Court  ha s ult ima te ju risdict ion “over all ma tt ers  r e la t ing to  the
in t erp re t a tion , pr ote ction  an d en force me nt  of th e pr ovisi ons of [t h e  Sou th  Af r ican ]
Const itu tion .” S. AF R . CO N S T . § 98(2) (1993). It is composed of a Preside nt a nd 10
o ther  judge s. See id . § 98(1). Each  mu st m eet  cert ain  qua lification s, see id. § 99(2)
possibilit y th at  legislat ion m ay, in  cert ain  circum st an ces, limit
the extent  of r eli giou s fr eedom s.  In  other  wor ds , some
leg is la t ion  or  other  st a te  act ion  cou ld on  i t s face violate one’s
freedom  of reli gion , b u t  such violation would not be
u n cons t itu t iona l becau se it s effects wer e min or or wer e felt
impor t an t . In  two sou thern  Afri can  count r ies , r eli giou s
freedom s ar e a mon g th ose liber tie s t ha t m ay not be  lim it ed  or
derogated.158 Oth er count ries a llow for r easona ble der oga t ions
of religious freedom for pu rposes  of na tion al d efens e, pu blic
sa fety,  pu blic order , pub lic mora lity, pu blic hea l th , or  for  the
purpose of pr ot ecting others’ religious rights.159 The Sou th
Afr ica n  Con st i t ut i on st at es th at  limita tions a re a llowed if they
a re re as ona ble a nd  jus tifia ble in  a d em ocrat ic society, a n d a l l
re leva nt  factor s  (a  p resumably inexhaus t ib le l ist  of which is
included in the  cons t it u t ion ) mus t  be  cons idered be fore  the
limitat ion is allowed.160
IV. RE L I G I O U S  F R E E D O M  CA SE  LAW IN SO U T H E R N  AF R I C A
 In  1995, one yea r a fter  a fu lly pa rt icipat ory ele ct ion  in
Sou th Afr ica , t he n ew Sou th  Afr ica n  Cons t itu t iona l Cour t  hea rd
its  first case. 161 Since t hen , t he Const it u t ion a l Cou r t  has
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( st a t ing a ju dge  mu st  be a  Sou t h  A fr i ca n  citizen, be fit and pr oper to serve as judge,
a n d be eith er a  past  judge, a dvocate, pr ofessor or expe rt  in const itu tiona l law of
Sou th  Africa), and e ach s erves  for a non -rene wable  ter m, see id . § 99(1). The
Pres iden t of South Africa h as a ut horit y to choose th e Pr esiden t of the  Const itu t iona l
Cou rt  an d four of its ju dges wit h m inim a l  co n su l t at ions  with  the  Cab ine t  and the
Chief J u d g e o f t h e  Su p r em e Cou r t .  S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . §§ 97(2)(a), 99(3) (1993). The
four  jud ges  th e P re sid en t ch ooses  mu st  come  from  a m on g  t h e j u dg es  of t h e  Su p r em e
Cour t . See id.  § 99(3 ). Th e P re sid en t m us t ch oose the final six judges from a shortlist
of na me s p rov ide d by  th e J ud icial Ser vice Commission, a group of judges, attorneys,
advocates, Mem ber s of P ar lia me nt , t he  Min ist er  of J us tice, and one  professor of law.
S ee id . §§ 99(4)-(5), 105(1). Similar  provisions  exist in  th e Fin al C on stit ut ion. S ee S.
AF R . CO N S T . §§ 167, 172, 174, 176, 178 (199 6).
162. S ee S v. Solberg, 1997 SACLR LEXIS 30 (CC Oct. 6, 1997); Fra ser  v.
Ch ildren ’s Cou rt , P re tor ia  Nor th , 19 97 (2 ) SA 2 61 (C C); I n  re D ispu te Concern ing the
Cons t it u t iona l it y of Certain P rovisions of the Ga uten g School Education Bill of 1995,
1996 (3) SA 165 (CC). The F ina l Const itu t ion con templa t e s  t hat  cases a r i sing du r ing
the ti me  befor e t he  Fi na l Con st it ut ion  wa s r at ified  in  199 6 wi ll be  deci d e d u n d e r  t he
Int erim  Const itu tion , un less ju stice ot her wise r equ ires . S ee S. AF R . CON S T . sched. 6,
§ 17 (1996) (“All p r oc eedings which were pending before a court when  the n ew
Con st itu tion  took effect, mu st be  disposed of as  if the n ew Const itu tio n  h ad  n ot  been
enacted, un less t he in ter ests  of justice re quir e oth erwis e.”). Thus, t he  ma jori ty of
cases cur re nt ly h ea rd  by t he  Con st itu tion al C our t  ar e still gover ned b y th e Int erim
Cons t itu tion , an d all t he r eligious liber ties ca ses h ave bee n decided  un der t he In ter im
Cons t it u t ion .
163. S ee Fra ser , 199 7 (2) SA a t 2 72-73 ; see also infra Pa rt  IV.A.
164. S ee Gauteng S chool Bill, 199 6 (3) SA a t 1 71-75 , 185  n.**; see also infra  Pa r t
IV.B.
165. S ee Solberg, 199 7 SAC LR L EXI S a t *9 9 (st at in g t ha t d ir ect  or i nd ir ect
coer cion  was necessary (and thu s at least sufficient) to establ ish  a vi olat ion of
r e ligious libe rt y); i d . at *115 (O’Regan, J ., dissenting) (arguin g tha t coercion was
su fficie nt ); i d . at  *177  (Sa chs , J ., con cur ri ng ) (su bm it ti ng  th at  coer cion  wa s s uffi cien t);
decided th re e im port an t ca ses  involvin g religious fr eedom
un der  the  In te r im Cons t itu t ion .162 In  these  cases  one  sees  the
begin nin gs of a  Sou th  Afr i can  r eligiou s fr eedom  ju r ispr ude nce
upon which  a ll  sou the rn African  count rie s m ay r ely.
Subsequen t judicia l opinions  in a ll of sout her n Africa w ill, in a ll
likelihood, examine these cases and apply t he ir r ea sonin g;
th erefore, th ese in itia l decisions  ar e cru cial st ar tin g point s for
t h e de vel opin g sou t h er n  Afri can  re l ig ious  f r e e dom
jurispr uden ce. In  one Const it u t ion a l Cou r t  de cis ion , t he Cour t
made  it  clea r  tha t  leg is la t ion  tha t  discr im in a tes  on the basis of
reli gion  is u n con st i tu t iona l ;163 however, the Court  has also
d et erm ined tha t  Sou th  Afr ica ns w ill  rece ive  no sp ecia l
t r ea tment  because  of their  reli gion .164 Addit iona lly, a
Cons t itu t iona l Court  decision determined th a t  proof of either
di rect  or  in di rect  coer cion  to act  cont ra ry t o one’s reli giou s
be lie f is  su fficie n t  to sh ow a  viola t ion  of freedom  of reli gion .165
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see also infra Par t IV.A.3. But  t h e  Co u r t  was  d iv ided on  whether  anyth ing less  than
coer cion  is a lso s ufficie nt  (for ex am ple , st at e en dor sem ent  of religion). S ee, e.g., i d .
a t  *177 (Sach s, J., concu rr ing). The coer cion holding in  Solberg complements  a  s imi la r
ho ld ing in a Zimbabwea n case,  In  re Chik weche, 1995  (4) SA 284 (Zimb.), which  held
tha t  coercion is sufficient to establish a claim for violation of religious freedom under
the Zimba bwe Con stit ut ion. This  Zimba bwe decision a lso held t ha t Ra sta faria nism  is
a  religion . See id.  at 290.
166. S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . § 8 (199 3).
167. 1997 (2) SA 2 61 (C C).
168. 74 of 1983, cited in Fra ser , 1997 (2) SA at 267.
169. S ee id . § 18(4)(d), quoted in  Fra ser , 1997 (2) SA at 267.
170. S ee id. (“A children ’s court  to which  appli cat ion f or an  order  of adoption is
made  . . . sha ll not  grant  the a pplication unless it is satisfied . . . (d) that consent
to the a doption has been given by both par ents  of the ch ild, or, if the  child is
illegitimat e, by the moth er of the child, whether or  not  su ch m oth er  is a  mi nor  or
mar ried woman and w h e t h e r  or  n ot s he  is a ssi st ed b y h er  pa re nt , gu ar dia n or
husban d, as t he ca se m ay be . . . .”), qu oted  in  Fra ser , 1997 (2) SA at 267.
171. S ee Fra ser , 1997 (2) SA at 266.
172. S ee id. at  267. 
173. S ee id . at  272. 
A. South African Religious Freedom  Case Law
1. Discr im in at ion  on th e Bas is  of R eligion : F ra ser  v.
Ch ildren ’s  Cour t , P re tor i a Nor th
 Section  8 of th e Sou t h  Afr i can  In t er im  Cons t it u t ion  forbids
discr imin at ion on the basis of a  number  of g rounds , including
re ligion .1 6 6  In  Fras er,167 th e petit ioner us ed section 8 to
cha llenge the ch ild  adop t ion  pr ovis ion s of t he S outh  Afr ica n
Child  Ca re Act  (the “Act”).168 In m ost inst an ces, the Act
requ ires  a court  to obtain the father’s and mot her ’s per mis sion
before it  wil l a llow an  adop t ion  of th eir ch ild.169 However ,
sect ion  18(4 )(d) p rovides  an  except ion  in  the ca se  of an
illegitim at e child : the m other ’s p er mission  a lon e is  su fficie n t  for
an  adop t ion  to tr an spire. 170 The pet itioner, Lawr ie John  Fr aser ,
lived unmarr ied  with  Adr iana  Pet ron ella  Na ude . Naude  became
pregnan t and decided  to pu t  their  child  up for  adop t ion .171
Fraser , wan t ing to either a dopt his child or preven t a doption by
someone else from occur rin g, cha lle nged  the con st it u t ion alit y of
se ct ion  18(4 )(d). 172
The Court  deter mined  th at  section 18 of th e Act violated
section  8 of t he In ter im  Con st it u t ion  because  it d iscr imina ted
against  fathers of certa in “mar ital unions.”173 In  so doing,  the
Cou r t  exa min ed  how t he Act  d is cr imina ted ba sed up on one’s
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174. S ee id .
175. S ee § 18(4)(d) of Child  Car e Act 74 of 1983, quoted in  Fra ser ,  1997 (2) SA
at  267.
176. S ee Fra ser , 1997 (2) SA at 272.
177. S ee id .
178. A cust omar y African u nion is a  tr adit ional m ar ria ge t h a t  occu r s a ft e r  t he
paymen t of labola (a gift of catt le from the hu sband t o the wife’s father ).  I t  is n ot
recognized as a  legal m ar ria ge except for cer ta in pu rposes  specified by law.  S ee § 27
of Child  Car e Act 74 of 1983, discussed in  Fra ser , 1997 (2) SA at 273.
179. S ee Fra ser , 199 7 (2) SA a t 2 73. I t h ad  als o been argu ed that  § 18(4)(d)
discriminated  against  “fath ers of certa in children on  th e bas is of their  gende r or t heir
ma r i t a l sta tu s,” i d ., an d “betwee n m ar ried  fath ers  an d un ma rr ied fat her s,” id . at 274.
These argum ents wer e not accepted b y the Cou rt  as a ddition al r eason s to decla re
§ 18(4)(d) uncons tit ut iona l. See id.  at 273-75.
If the Constitutional Court determ ines tha t “any la w or an y provision t her eof is
inconsis t e n t with th[e] Constitut ion,” it may “declare such law or provision invalid to
the extent of its inconsistency.” S. AF R . CO N S T . § 98(5) (1993). However , t he
Cons t i tu t iona l Cou rt  al so h as  th e a ut hor it y t o “req ui re  Pa rl ia me nt  . . . t o corr ect  th e
defe ct  in t he la w or pr ovision, which s ha ll the n r ema in in  fo r ce  p en ding  corr ect ion
or  the ex pir y of th e per iod so specified.” Id . The Con stit ut ional Cou rt , pur sua nt  to its
au thor i ty to do so, requ este d Pa rlia men t t o rewr ite se ction 18(4)(d) with i n  two years.
In  or der  to a ssi st  Pa rl iam en t in  dr aft ing  a con st itu tion al p rov ision , th e Cou r t
reviewed the stat utory law and case law of other countries and  outlined some issues
reli gion  and  mar riage performed u nder t hat  religion. It
observed  th at  in S out h Africa , Isla mic m ar ria ges a re  not  legal
because  of the p oten tia l for polygam y th at  exist s  in  these
unions.174 Children  bor n  in to un ions  sol emnized  unde r  Is lamic
law  ar e consider ed illegit i m a te, a nd t heir  fa ther s,  wh et her  or
not  th ey act ua lly pra ctice polygam y, do not have the sam e
r igh t s as t heir  mother s u nde r  the Child  Ca re Act .175 An  I sl amic
mothers’ per mis sion is p rer equ isit e to he r  ch i ld ’s  adop t ion—the
fa t hers’ permiss ion  is  not .176 Because of the inequ ality bet ween
a  fa the r  and mother in a n Isla mic union, th e Court  declared
section  18 of the  Act un const itu tion al. 177
The Court  also emphasized tha t t he section discrimin at ed
against  fa ther s of I slamic u n ion s a s w ell  as a ga in st  fa thers of
cus tomary Africa n  unions.178 The Act specifically accepts
Afr ica n  cus tomary un ions  a s l egal  mar r iages for  p u rposes of
ce r ta in  provisions of t he  Act , in clu ding t he a dop t ion  pr ovis ion s.
This  means a  fa the r  in  a  cus tomary  Afr ican  un ion  mu st give
p er m ission  before h is child is adopted, but  in th e s a me
ci rcumstance permiss ion  of a Muslim fath er is not required.
Because  of this  addit ion a l d iscr im in a tory effe ct  on  the basi s of
r eli gion , th e Court  foun d sect i on 18 of the Act
uncons t itu t iona l .179
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of wh ich  Par l iamen t  shou l d  be  a war e. S ee Fra ser , 1997 (2) SA at 275-82. Parliamen t
has since d ra fted le gislat ion t o repla ce section  18(4)(d) of th e Act. S ee Lindsay Barnes,
A R ay o f H ope for  Un m arr ied  Fa t h ers, AF R . NEWS , Aug. 25, 199 7, avai lab le  in  LEXIS,
News  Library, Cur nws File.
180. S ee supra  Par t III.B.
181. S ee Brink  v. Kit shoff NO, 1996 (4) SA 197, 215-16 (CC) (discussing t he
Universa l Declaration of Human  Rights, Inter nat ional Covena nt  on  Civi l and  Pol it i ca l
Rights, an d t he  con st it ut ion s of t he  Un it ed  St at es  of Am er ica , In dia , a nd  Ca na da ).
182. Compare S. AF R . CO N S T . § 8(2) (1993) (“No person s ha ll be un fairly
discriminated  aga ins t, d ir ect ly or  ind ir ect ly . . . , on  one  or m ore  of th e following
grounds . . . [including] re ligion  . . . .”), with  MALAWI CO N S T . § 20(1) (“Discr im ina tion
of persons in any form is prohibited and all persons are , u n d e r  a ny law, guara nteed
equa l an d effect ive p rot ect ion a gai ns t d iscr im ina tion  on gr oun ds of . . .
religi on  . . . .”), and NAMIB. CO N S T . § 10(2) (“N o persons may be discriminated a g a in st
on  th e gr ou nd s of . .  . r eli gion  . . . . ”).
183. S ee BOTS . CO N S T . § 15; S WAZ. CO N S T . § 15; ZAMBIA CO N S T . § 23; ZI M B.
CO N S T . § 23.
Fras er was correctly decided an d is pers ua sive precedent
upon wh ich  othe r  sou the rn Afr ica n  count r ies  could  rely . Sect ion
18(4)(d) of th e Act clearly did n ot provide father s  in  Isla mic
ma rr iages th e sam e r ights as fath ers in other t ypes of
ma rr iages and  was thus  d iscr imina tory  on  the ba si s of r eli gion .
Each  sou ther n  Afr ica n  const it u t ion  forbid s d iscr im in a t ion  on
t he ba si s of r eli gion ,180 an d a s t he Con st itu tion al Cou r t  h as
observed, a  number  of other  na t ions ’ cons t itu t ions  and  human
r igh t s instrum ents also forbid  d iscr imina t ion .181 The Sou th
Afr ica n  Cons t itu t iona l  C ou r t  was  cor rect  in  st r ik ing  down the
offend ing por t ion  of the Act  as i t  did—d iscr im in a t ion  on the
basis of religion sh ould n ot be t olera ted  an d dis crim ina tin g
legislat ion should be stru ck down.
As pr evious ly me nt ioned , Nam ibia  an d Ma law i both  ha ve
cons t itu t iona l provisions similar  to South  Africa’s th at  preven t
discr imin at ion spe cifically on  t h e ba si s of r eli gion .182
Accordingly,  Fras er sh ould  be  app lica ble  and h elp fu l t o cour t s
in  th ese t wo count rie s in  case s in volving t he re ligion  a spect  of
th eir  equ alit y pr ovisions. Wh e n  a  law in t hose coun tr ies
discrimina tes  aga ins t m emb ers  of cert ain  religions  by gra nt ing
th em more rights (or  t ak ing a way t heir  righ ts ), the  law s hou ld
be st ru ck down  as  th e pr ovision of the Ch ild Car e Act was  in
Fras er.
However , other  sou th ern  Afr i can  coun t r ie s’ equa li t y
prov is ions p rotect  ci t izens  from discrim inat ion based on one’s
“creed ” with ou t  sp ecifi ca lly  m en t ion in g r eli gion .1 8 3  As
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184. S ee supra  Par t III.B.
185. 1996 (3) SA 165 (CC) [hereina fter Gau ten g S chool ]. 
186. S. AF R . CO N S T . § 98(2 )(d) (199 3). S out h Afr ica  co n t ai n s n ine  provinces  tha t
each  have provincial legislatu res an d power over c er t a i n  a spects of South Africans’
lives. See id.  ch.  9 (19 93).
187. S ee id . § 98(9). 
188. Gau teng is a  pr ovin ce in  nor th -cen tr al  Sou th  Africa  th at  i n cludes two
impor t an t  c it i es : P re tor i a  and Johannesburg.
189. S ee Sch ool E du cat ion  Bil l of 1995, qu oted  in part in  Gau ten g S chool ,  (3) SA
at  170-71. 
190. S ee id .
191. S ee supra  note 153.
pr eviously mentioned, creed should be interpreted to at  least
include religious beliefs.184 The fact  t ha t  some claus es protect
“religion ” and oth ers  “creed ” sh ould not m inimize Fras er’s effect
as per su as ive pr eceden ce in in te rp re tin g an d a pplyin g a
coun t ry’s discrimination clause with respect to religion. Thus,
the Sou th  Afr ican  Cons t itu t iona l Cour t  judgment  in  Fras er
ar guably could apply to cases in Botswan a, Swa zilan d, Zam bia,
or  Zimbabwe dea ling with discrim inat ion on the ba sis of creed,
in  ad dit ion to cas es in volving religious  discr imin at ion in
Na mibia  an d Ma law i. Fras er could—and should—a ss is t  the
cour t s in th ese count r ies  by s t anding for  the p ropos it ion  tha t
legisla tion  ha ving a  discr imin at ing effect or p ut tin g individ ua ls
on a n u neq ua l level becau se of religion is u ncons tit ut iona l.
2. Religious S chools: In re Ga uten g School E du ca t ion  Bil l of
1995
 The Con st it u t ion a l Cou r t  dea lt  with a n em otionally cha rged
cu l tu ra l, lingu ist ic, an d r eligious issu e in th e In  re Gauteng
S chool Ed ucation Bill of 1995185 ca se. Th e Cour t h as  origina l
ju r isdict ion  to issu e a dvisor y opinion s r ega rd ing “th e
cons t it u t iona li t y of any Bill b efore . . . a  p rov incia l
legislatu re”186 i f one-thi rd  of the  members  request  the  speaker
of th e legislatur e to subm it th e bill  be fore  the Cour t .187 The
spea ker  of the  Gauteng188 provincial legislat ur e peti -tioned the
Cou r t  t o det e rmine  the cons t it u t iona lit y of pr ovis ion s of t he
1995 Gau ten g School E d u ca t ion Bill.189 The Bill esta blished
cer t a in  req uir eme nt s for pu blic schools rela tin g to, int er a lia,
langu age, religious policy, and  freedom of conscience.190
Pe t it i one r s and t heir s upport ing am icus group were
Afr ikane r s191 who wanted t heir children to be educated at
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 2\ F I N A L \ B L A- F IN . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
515] RELIGI OUS F REE DOM IN S OUTH ERN  AFRICA 547
192. S ee Gau teng S chool, (3) SA at 171 . 
193. S ee Gau teng School, (3) SA at 170-71 (conta inin g th e text  an d discus sing t he
constit ut ionalit y of §§ 19 (1), 2 1(2)-(3),  and 22(3 ) of th e S cho ol E du cat ion  Bil l of 19 95).
194. S ee id. at  172. 
195. S ee id. 
196. S ee id . at 186 (Sachs, J., concurring). While petiti on ers  were  well with in
th eir  legal rights to do so, it is ironic that  Afrikaner s would make a r g u men t s
suppor t ed by human  rights documents, since Afrikaner  politicians denounced human
r igh t s inst ru men ts, see  J ohn  Duga rd, Hum an R ights and  the Ru le of Law in
Postapartheid  S out h A fri ca, in  SOUTH  AFRICA’S  CRISIS  O F  CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY:
CAN  T H E  U.S. CON S T I T U TI O N  H ELP ? 122, 123 (Robert A. Licht & Bert us de Villiers
eds.,  199 4) (st at in g on e pr es ide nt  du ri ng  ap ar th eid  cha ra cter ized  human r igh ts  as an
inst rumen t o f in te rna t iona l c om m u n ism ), an d S out h Afr ica n cou rt s (m an y of wh ich
were pres ided over b y Afrikan er ju dges) refused to  observe human  r igh t s  norms  and
specifically r e ject ed  a rgumen t s  t hat  hu m a n  rig ht s in st ru me nt s h ad  th e st at us  of
customary int ern at iona l law. S ee J ohn  Duga rd, Th e Role of Internationa l Law in
In terpre ting the Bill of  Rights ,  10 S. AF R . J . H U M . RTS . 208, 209 (1994) (discussin g
how tw o Sou th  Africa n d ecision s, S  v. P eta ne and S v. R udm an ,  rejected the
Universa l Declaration of Human  Rights, Inter nat ional Covenant  on  Civi l and  Pol it i ca l
Rights, and both the Eur opean and American Conventions as cus tomary in te rna t iona l
la w).  Anti-ap ar th eid act ivists’ cases t ha t a ppea led to in te r na t iona l  lega l  norms  to
sh ow th e inju stice of ap ar th eid u sua lly failed. S ee DUGARD, supra  no te 7 , a t  21
(describin g a n um ber  of cas es  in  wh ich  in te rn at ion al  la w wa s u ns ucce ssfully  used,
exclusively Afr i kaa ns -lan gua ge schools wit h Ch ris tia n va lue
sys t ems tha t  requ ired  religiou s cla ss es  as p ar t  of th e
cu r r icu lum.192 They argu ed th at  sections of th e Act violated
th eir  cons t itu t iona l  right s b y a boli sh in g la ngu age com pe ten cy
te st s in school admissions procedures, limit ing a  school’s a bility
to establish  its  own religious policy, and  cutt ing off governm ent
fund ing of sch ools  tha t  requ ir ed  reli giou s e du ca t ion .193
Pe t it i one r s also cont ended t ha t sect ion 32(c) of the I nt erim
Con st it u t ion  created a positive obligation on th e Sta te t o
es tabl ish , wh er e p ract ica ble , ed uca t ion a l in st it u t ion s b ase d on
a  common  cult u r e , l a ngu age,  or  reli gion  so long a s t he s chool
did  not  d is cr imina te on t he ba sis of ra ce.194 This  ar gum ent , if
endorsed  by the Const itut ional Court , would requir e th e sta t e
to est ablis h a nd  pa y th e costs of schools to which  the appl ican t s
could send their children—schools  t ha t  admi t ted s tuden t s
based  upon  competency  in  Afr ikaan s, t ha t  de velope d r eli giou s
pol icy with out  st a te in ter fer en ce, a nd t ha t  requ ir ed  reli giou s
ins tr uct ion despite the beliefs of its studen t s.195 The a rgument
based  on se ct ion  32(c) of the Const itu tion was  th e petit ioner’s
main  con ten t ion ,  and  they  a rgued tha t  in terna t iona l  human
r igh t s docu me n t s dealing with the rights of minority groups
supported their claims.196
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inter  alia, to challenge restrictions on the freedom of movement, to oppose ra cially-
based  zoni ng  law s, t o dis pu te  th e le gal ity  of cros s-bor de r  ar res ts in volving kidn appin g,
and to c ha lle ng e ju ri sd ict ion ).
197. S ee Gau ten g S chool , (3) SA at 172-73.
198. Id . at 172 (quoting S. AF R . CO N S T . § 32(c) (199 3)).
199. Id . at  173. 
200. S ee S. AF R . CO N S T . §§ 32(a), (b) (1993) (“Every person sh all have th e
r igh t—(a) to basic education and to equal access to educat ion al  in st it ut ion s; (b ) to
ins tr uct ion  in  th e la ng ua ge of h is or  he r ch oice where th is is re ason ably
pra cticable  . . . . ”).
201. Id . § 32(c) (e mp ha sis  ad de d).
202. A coun te ra r gumen t might  be that  section 32(c) must  be read in a nother
context  of section 32(a), which gr an ts t o every per son t he r ight  to  a n  edu cation . S ee
id . § 32(a ). If eve ry  per son  is e nt itl ed t o an  edu cat ion ,  it  i s p re sumed  tha t t he
government  mu st pr ovide th e expen ses for t ha t edu cation. If  un der  se cti on 3 2(c)
individu als  ha ve th e righ t t o esta blish ed ucat ional facilit ies, tha t right  should be
su bject  to th e sta te obligat ion in se ction 32(a) to pa y for e ducational expenses.
Gauteng S chool ,  however, did not read section 32 and its subpar t s  a s sayin g th is. S ee
Gau teng S chool , (3) SA at 172-73.
203. S ee Gau ten g S chool , (3) S A at  184  n. 38 (K ri egl er , J ., con cur ri ng ).
The Cour t d ism isse d pe tit ioner s’ re ad ing of se ct ion  32(c)
based  upon t he p lain  mea nin g of th e sect ion an d t he cont ext in
which  the section is found in the Interim Constit u t ion .197
Section  32(c) rea ds: “Ever y per son s ha ll ha ve th e r ight  . . . to
es tabl ish , whe re p ra cticable, ed uca tion al institut ions based on
a  common  cult ur e, lan gua ge or r eligion, pr ovided tha t  t here
sha ll be no discrim inat ion on the gr ound of race.”198 The Cour t
r e a d t h is section as not affirma tively “conferring on the St ate
an  ob liga t ion  to estab li sh  such  educa t iona l  ins t itu t ions ,” bu t
only pr oviding t ha t cit izens h ave t he r igh t  to es tabli sh  su ch
inst i tu t ions wit h ou t  in ter fe rence  from the  government .199 This
reading  is su ppor te d by t he  lingu ist ic an d gr am ma tica l conte xt
in  wh ich  se ct ion  32(c) is  foun d.  Sect ion  32(a ) and (b) both confer
r igh t s to citizens: the right t o education and t he r ight , if
p ract i ca l , to educa t ion  in  one’s own language .200 A right is also
conferr ed in  section  32(c)—the r igh t  “to establish”201 a s chool,
not  to ha ve a s chool established for the petitioners. Read in  the
conte xt  of sect ion  32 as a  wh ole,  su bs ect ion  (c) d id  not  suppor t
pet i t ione r ’s re ad ing t ha t t he y ar e en tit led t o ha ve a  ce r t a in  type
of school esta blished for them .202
The effect of th e ma jority’s opin ion  is  sp ell ed  out  eve n  more
clear ly i n  J u dge Kriegler’s concur ring opinion: the Afrikan ers
must  pay t he costs of schools they establish.203 In the first
Const i t ut i ona l Cou r t  opin ion  (be  it  major it y, con cur ren ce, or
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204. Ju dge Kr iegler’s wr iti ng  in Afr ika an s is , m ost  lik ely, a n a tt em pt  to s how
under st and ing an d sen sitivit y to th e Afrikaa ns p ar tie s  t o  t he case  and  the  Af r ikaans
communi ty gener ally. Dur ing a par th eid, Afrika an s and En glish were t he only two
official la ng ua ges  of S ou t h  Af r ica, see S. AF R . CO N S T . § 89(1) (1983), and  judicial
opin ions were  often wr itt en in  Afrikaa ns. Wh ile Afrikaa ns is  still a n  official lan gua ge
under  t he Inter im Con stit ut ion, see S. AF R . CO N S T . § 3(1) (1993), and  th e Fin al
Cons t it u t ion , see S. AF R . CO N S T . § 6(1) (1996), no Const itu t iona l  Cour t  judge had
written  an opinion in Afrikaans u ntil Kriegler did in the in stan t case.
205. Gauteng S chool , (3) SA at 185 n.42 (Kriegler, J ., concurr ing) (transla tion by
ed ito r s of Sou th  Afri can  La w Re por ts ).
206. S ee id . at  185 -208  (Sa chs , J ., con cur ri ng ). J ud ge S ach s’ concu r r e n ce  s te m s
from  h i s unsa t is fac tion  wit h t he  ma jor it y’s “str ai gh tfor wa rd  re ad in g” of sect ion  32(c)
and desire t o follow thr ough wit h pe tit ioner s’ inter na tion al la w ar gum ent . Id. at 185-
86. Sachs examined  a va st a rr ay of hum an  righ ts docum ent s to det erm ine if
in te rna t iona l law elucidates  section  32(c). S ee id. at  190-207 (Sachs , J., concur rin g)
(examin ing a de cision of th e Pe rm an ent  Cour t of Int ern at iona l J ust ice, th e U. N .
Char t er , the U niversal Declarat ion, the Inter nat ional Covenant, th e wr itin gs of
in te rna t iona l lega l schola rs, t wo Int ern at iona l Labor  Orga niza tion  conven tion s, a
s t a t emen t  of the U . N. Hum an Rights  Committee, th e U. N. Convent ion o n  the
Pr eve nt ion  an d  P unishm ent of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, the E uropean
Conven t ion , t he  In te rna t iona l Convent ion on t he E limin at ion of all Form s of Racial
Dis crim ina tion  of 1950, the Convention on the E limin ation of Discrimination Against
Women of 1953, decision s of th e E ur opea n C our t on  Hu ma n R igh ts , th e Con ven tion
on  t h e  Su p p re s si on  a n d  P unishmen t of the Crim e of Apart heid of 1973, the UNE SCO
Con ven tion  ag ai ns t D iscr im in at ion  in  Ed uca t ion of 19 60, a nd  th e Con ven tion  for t he
Pr ote ction  of Na ti on al  Min or it ies ).
In  Sachs ’ v iew, human  r igh t s  t r eat i es  not e the presence of six minority rights:
existence, non-discr imin at ion, equa lity, au tonom ous deve lopmen t wit hin  civil society,
affirma tive  action , an d posit ive su pport  from t he s ta te. S ee id. at 196. However , non e
of these r ights requ ires a st ate t o provide special benefits  to  minor it i es,  such  as
un ique sch ools for  mi nor ity  gr oup s, e ven  if it i s a  re ligiou s m inor i t y. Sachs’
conclu sion , as well as his interpreta tion of secti on  32(c),  is identical to the majority’s:
“I would accordingly say tha t s[ection] 32(c) of the Constitut ion should be interpr eted
in  th e way t ha t [th e ma jority opin ion] has  done, a nd t ha t in te r n a t iona l l aw on  the
su bject  r ei n for ce s the c on clusions to which  [it ] comes .” Id. at  208. 
d is sen t ) to be wr it t en  in  Afr ikaans,2 0 4  Kr ieg le r  elucida ted the
resul t  of the  deci sion :
[P e t it io n er s ] a r e  a t  l ib e r t y h a rm on iou s ly  to p r es er v e t h e
her i tage  of th eir  fat h er s for  t h eir ch ildr en  [by es ta blish ing
sch ools base d on comm on cul tu re ,  lan gua ge or  re l igion ]. Bu t
t h e r e i s  a  p r i ce , nam e ly th at  [th ey] will h av e t o dig in to [th eir ]
own  pock et [s] th er efor . In  a s en se , th e p re se n t d isp u te  is n ot
abou t  a  people’s  her i tage b ut  abou t  m oney. 205
Judge Sa chs, in  an oth er s epa ra te concu rr ence, a gree d wit h t he
Cour t ’s in terp re tat ion  of sect ion  32 (c) and  emphas ized  the
decision’s conforman ce to int erna tional law.206
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207. S ee Gau ten g S chool , (3) SA at 185 n.4 2 (Kriegle r,  J ., concur rin g)
(“[Petitioners] w il l h ave t o dig  in to [t he ir ] own  pock et  [for t he  cost s of t he ir  sch ool].
In  a s en se , t he  pr es en t d isp ut e is  . . . a bou t m on ey. ”).
208. S ee, e.g.,  Everson v. Board of Educa t ion of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)
(“The ‘esta blish m e n t  of religion’ clause of the First Amen dment  [to the United St ates
Cons t it u t ion ] means  a t  lea s t  t h is : Ne ithe r  a  s t a t e nor  th e Fe der al Gover nm ent  . . .
can  pa ss l aw s wh ich a id on e r eligi on, a id a ll r eligi ons , or pr efer  on e religion over
an oth er.”).
209. The Sou th Afr ican Con stit ut ional h as a lrea dy seen  th e wisdom  of this
a rgumen t . S ee Pr ins loo v. Va n d er  Lin de,  1997  (3) SA 10 12, 1 023 (C C) (“[T]his  Cou rt
shou ld be astut e not to lay down sweeping in ter pret at ions a t t his s ta ge but  shou ld
all ow equ al it y doct r i n e t o develop slowly and, h opefully, sur ely.”); S v. Solberg, 1997
SACLR LEXIS 3 0, *129 (CC Oct. 6, 1 997) (Sach s, J ., concu r ring) (“We [have]
empha sised th at  we sh ould be a stu te n ot to lay d own swee ping in ter pret at ions a t t his
sta ge bu t should allow doctrine to develop slowly and, hopefully, surely, on a case by
case ba sis  wit h s pecia l em ph as is on  th e a ctu al con te xt i n w hich  ea ch p rob lem  ar ose.”).
210. S ee MALAWI CO N S T . § 25(3) (ment ioning poss ibility of “priva te” schooling
(includin g, presum ably, religiously based schools), provided such education meets
certa in  sta nda rds , but  does not  specifically men tion a  religion ’s right to establish
sch ool); ZAMBIA CO N S T . § 19(3) (ment ioning r eligions’ right t o provide edu cat ion for
i t s me mb er s bu t n ot d iscu ssi ng  wh o will p ay); Z I M B. CO N S T . § 19(3) (contem plat ing
poss ib il it y for sta te su bsidy bu t in  doing so imp lying th at  relig ion may  bea r  p r imary
expense for  ed uca ti on ).
Gauteng S chool cou ld  st and for  se vera l p ropos it ion s.  At  the
least, the case holds tha t  wh er e a  sou ther n  Afr ica n  const it u t ion
does not explicitly express t hat  th e sta te will pay th e expenses
of a  reli giou sly for med  sch ool, t he r eli gion  m us t  bear  the
costs.207 In a  broader  sense, t he case could repr esent  th e
posit ion tha t  r el ig ions  a re not  en t it l ed  to a n y  a ffirm at ive
bene fi t s or  a id from the  sta te. This  br oade r h olding is
cons is tent  with  th e case  law  of t he  Un i ted S ta t es208 and ma y be
adopted  by S outh  Afr ica  in  the  fu tu re , bu t  Gauteng  School
shou ld not be us ed for su ch a br oad proposition at  th is time.
There is a defin ite  ad van ta ge to al lowing t he ju r ispr ude nce of a
s ta te to evolve  slowly  and s urely , r a ther  than  using ca se s for
the br oadest r eadin g possible.209 Th e limit ed  hold in g—t ha t
when  a southern African constitution does not specifically so
sta te,  the gover nmen t  sh ould  not  pa y t he cos t s of a  reli giou s
sch ool—is  both  cor rect  and  sufficient  a  holding for  t he  time
bein g.
Because  of the  first , mor e lim ite d r ea din g, Gau t en g  S chool
may be useful in futu re decisions in Malawi and Zambia, whose
cons t itu t ions a re  ambiguous  abou t  (or  do not  ment ion) the  is sue
of expense in schools formed by religious organizations.210 The
constitut ions of these count ries  do not e xplicitly give  a  reli giou s
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211. S ee MALAWI CO N S T . § 25(3 ); ZAMBI A CO N S T . § 19(3 ).
212. Compare S. AF R . CO N S T . § 32(c) (1993) (“[T]o establish, where pr acticable,
educa t iona l instit utions ba s e d o n  a common cultur e, language or religion, provided
tha t  th ere s ha ll be n o discr im in at ion  on  th e gr ou nd  of ra ce.”) with  MALAWI CO N S T .
§ 25(3) (“Pr ivate  schools and other private institutions of highe r lear ning sh all be
permissible, provided t h a t — (a )  such  schools  or  ins t itu t ions  a re  regi s tered  wi th  a  S ta te
depa r tmen t in  acco rd an ce w it h t he  la w; (b) t he  sta nda rds  ma int ain ed by su ch schools
or  inst itu tions  ar e not  inferior  to official st an dar ds in S ta te sch ools.”) and  ZAMBIA
CO N S T . § 19(3) (“No r eligi ous  c om m u n i t y or d en omi na tion  sh all  be p re ven te d fr om
prov id ing re ligiou s in st ru ction  for p er son s of t ha t com mu ni ty or  denomina t ion  in  the
course  of  an y  edu cat ion p rov ide d by t he  comm un ity  or d en omi na tion  or fr om
es tabl ish ing and  ma in ta in ing in st i t u t ions to p ro vid e s ocia l se rv ices  for  su ch p er son s.”).
213. S ee Gau ten g S chool , (3) S A at  185  n. 42 (K ri egl er , J ., con cur ri ng ).
214. S ee BOTS . CO N S T . § 11(2); N AMIB. CO N S T . § 20(4); S. AF R . CO N S T . § 29(3)
(199 6);  SWAZ . CO N S T . § 11(2). Sachs’ concurr ence in the Gauteng S chool  case may also
be usef ul  in  fu t u re cases  (be the y religious  freedom  cases or  othe rwise ) for t he er udit e
pr ese nt at ion  of the r ight s of minor ities a s glean ed from in terna t iona l  human  r igh t s
instrumen ts.
215. S v. S olbe rg , 19 97 S ACLR  LE XIS  30 (C C Oct . 6,  199 7).
community the right to establish sch ools bu t d o specifically
con templa te su ch a  possib ility. 211 However, like th e Sou th
Afr ica n  Int erim Cons titu tion, un der w h ich  Gauteng S chools
was decided, t he M ala wian  an d Zam bian  const itu tion s fail t o
men tion whet her  th e sta te or  the r eli giou s d en omin a t ion  would
bear  the expen se . Sect ion  32(c) of the In ter im  Con st i t u tion ,
section 25(3) of th e Malawi cons t it u t ion  and  sect ion  19(3 ) of th e
Zam bian  cons t it u t ion  a re  not  exact ly the  same ,212 bu t  Gauteng
S chool could st ill be us eful in  in ter pr etin g th e Ma lawia n a nd
Zam bian  cons t itu t ions  by  stand ing  for  the  propos it ion  tha t
where a  cons t itu t ion  does  not  exp lici t ly s t a te t ha t  the cou nt ry
will pay the expenses of a r eligious ly forme d sch ool, the  reli gion
must  bear  the costs.213 As important a  decision as Gauteng
S chool was for th e parties involved, it  will prob a bly ha ve litt le
effect  on  case l aw  in  sou the rn Afr i can  coun t r ie s other  than
Malawi  and Za mbia : most  sou ther n  Afr ica n  const it u t ion s
(includin g the  Final  Sou th African  Cons tit ut ion) explicit ly st at e
tha t  r e ligions  may estab li sh  schools, bu t  a t  the r eli gion ’s
expense. 214
3. S unday  Liquor L aw s a nd  R eligiou s Freed om : S v. Solberg
 T h e C on s t it u t i on a l  Cou r t ’s m ost  recen t  case imp licat ing
religious freedom (and t he first  to addr ess t he r eligion claus e,
section  14) is S olberg,215 wh ich  in volve d a  pr ovis ion  of th e
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216. 27 of 1989, cited in Solberg, 1997 SACLR LEXIS at *22-*23.
217. S ee Solberg, 1997 SACLR LEXIS at *26. The Solberg defe nd an ts  ea ch
possessed a gr ocer’s wine  license, u nder  which t hey co u ld  s el l n o alcohol other t han
ta ble wine a nd could s ell ta ble win e only weekdays from 8:00 AM to 8:00 PM,
Sat ur days  8:00 AM to 5:00 PM, but in no cases on Sundays, Good F r iday  and
Chr i stmas Day. See id.  at *27.
218. S ee id .
219. S ee id . at *23.
220. S ee id . at *42-*75.
221. S ee id . at *81-*82.
222. S ee id . at *75.
223. S ee id . at *100.
224. S ee id . at *81-*82.
225. Id . at *83.
226. S. AF R . CO N S T . § 14(1 ) (199 3).
Liq uor  Act .216 The Act  is  qu it e d et a ile d a nd p rovid es  for  a
var iety of liquor  licenses , each  allowin g th e license e to sell
ce r ta in  types of liquor a t cert ain p laces at  certa in  times.217
Licensees selling liquor  in violat ion of the cond itions  of their
res pe ct ive  license s ca n  be  convict ed  for  the offense.218 The t hr ee
appel lan t s ha d each been  convicted un der t he Act  of selling
a lcoh ol in viola tion  of the ir liq uor  licens es: one, M s. Solber g ha d
sold on  Sunday,  a  “closed day” to a lcohol  sa les  under  the  Act  for
her  par ticular  license. 219 Ea ch  of the  appel lan t s  a rgued the
prov is ions of th e Act in qu estion violated t h e r igh t  t o economic
act ivity gu aran teed in  se ct ion  26 of the In ter im  Con st it u t ion .220
Addit iona lly, Ms. Solberg con tended the Act violated section 14,
th e right  to freedom of religion, belief and  op in ion .221 The Cour t
una nimously agreed that a ppellan t s ’ sect ion  26 a rguments
failed.222 Addition ally, t he Cou rt  held  t h a t  t h e Act did not
viola te Ms.  Solberg’s fr eedom  of reli gion .223
Solberg had  a rgued tha t  i t  was a  viola t ion  of sect ion  14 for
her  not  to be  able  to se ll l iqu or  on a  “closed da y,” defined un der
the Act  as  Sunday , Good  Fr iday,  and Chr is tmas  Day .224 He r
belief wa s t ha t  th is  pr ohibi t ion  “ind uce[d] subm ission  to [or
alt er na tive ly, compelled the  obser va nce of ] a  secta r ian
Chr ist ian  conception of th e pr oper obse rva nce of th e Chr ist ian
sabba th and  Chr istian holidays”225 in viola tion  of her  righ ts
un der  section 14, which guar an tees “[e]very per son[’s] . . . righ t
to freedom  of conscien ce, r eligion , t hough t , be lie f and
opinion .”226 However, this argument  appeared t o the judges to
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227. S ee Solberg, 199 7 SAC LR L EXI S a t *1 27-*2 8 (Sa chs , J ., con c urring) (“[This]
challen ge . . . came n ot from be lievers  whos e fa ith  wa s be ing  th re at en ed,  bu t fr om
gr ocer s whose p rofits wer e being lim ited. . . . [T]he r esu lt wa s an  air  of artificial it y
in  rela tion  to th is as pect of th e case , an d a la ck of ev ide nce  . . . on  th e qu est ion of
the pu rp ose  an d im pa ct o f clos ed  da ys. ” (footn ote  om it te d)).
228. S ee id . at *93.
229. S ee id . at *100.
230. Chaska l son’s opin ion r ea son s t ha t fr eed om of relig ion  “imp lies  an  ab se nce
of coercion or const ra int  an d th at  freedom  of religion  m a y  be  im paired by mea sures
tha t  force  peo ple  to a ct o r ref ra in fr om a ctin g in  a m an ne r con tr ar y to t he ir  re ligiou s
beliefs.” Id . at  *91. H e con tin ue d: “The coercion may be direct or indirect,  but it  must
be es tabl is hed  to giv e r is e t o a n  in fr in ge men t  of t he f r ee do m of r el ig ion .” Id . at *99.
Fur the r , th e per son claim ing a  violation of section  1 4 m u st  est ab lish  th at  a coe rcion
or  cons t r a in t  has  occu r red . See id.  Using this “coer cion ” t e s t , Chaske lson  conc ludes:
It  is d ifficult to d isce rn  an y coer cion or  cons tr ain t im pose d by s ect ion 9 0 of
the Liquor Act on th e religious beliefs of holders of grocers’ wine licences
or  an y oth er p ers on, or  any  re ligiou s pu rp ose s er ved  by s uch  pr ohib iti on.
The section d oes not com pel licencees or  an y othe r p er son s, d ir ect ly or
indir ectly, t o  observe the C h r is t i an  Sabba th . I t  does  not  in  any way
cons t ra in th eir r ight  to ent ert ain  such  religious  belief s a s  t h ey might choose,
or  to d ecla re  th eir  re ligiou s be liefs  open ly, or  to m anifest t he ir  r e ligious
beliefs. It does not compel th em  to op en  or clos e t he ir  bu sin ess es on  a
Sun day.
Id . at *93.
Chaska l son’s opinion rejects the Un ited States jurisprudence under the First
Amendmen t , st at ing : “Our  Con st itu tion  dea ls w ith  iss ue s of r eligi on d iffer en tly  to t he
United  Sta tes  Const itu tion .” Id . a t  *95.  Th i s i s an  a t t ack  on  the  two other  opinions’
use of the endorsement th eory suggested by Fi rs t Am en dm en t ju ri sp ru den ce, w hi ch
is exp la in ed  bel ow. R at he r,  he  follow s C an ad ia n i nt er pr et at ion  of fre ed om  of r eligion ,
see id . at *90, found in t he Can adian Su preme C ou r t ’s  decision in Regin a v. Big M
Drug Mar t L td . [1985 ] 13 CR R 64.  How eve r, C ha sk als on r eject s  t he  holding in  Big
M  (th at  th e Ca na dia n L ord ’s Da y Act  wa s u ncon st it ut ion al ) beca us e of fa ctu al
differences. See Solberg, 1997 SACLR LEXIS at *87-*88.
Sum ma rizing,  Ch as ka lson  wou ld fin d a  viola tion  of free dom  of reli gion if one could
prove  th ey ha d been  coerced, eit her  dire ctly or in dire ctly, to  a c t con t r ary  to the ir
r e ligious beliefs. For him, coercion is not only sufficient, it is necessa r y. In
be “a r t i fi cia l”—more  focused  on  her  loss of p rofit  on  Su nda y
rat her th an a t hreat  to her religious beliefs.227
Thr ee judges wrote opinions on th e section 14 issue.
Presiden t Chaska l son’s, which  th ree  oth er ju dges joined , held
tha t  th e Act  in  no wa y viol a ted  se ct ion  14 because  it  did n ot
coerce or constrain  Ms. Solberg’s relig iou s beli ef;228 any
connect ion  between  th e Chr istian  Sabba th  an d th e re st rict ion
from se lling liqu or  unde r  Solberg’s l icen se  on Su nda y wa s “t oo
tenuous” to be an  in fr ingemen t  on  r eli giou s fr eedom .229
Chaskalson would find a violat ion of religious libert y onl y if t he
petit ioner proved she was coerced to act contr ar y to her
r e ligiou s beliefs.230 Judge Sachs  d isagreed  with  Chaska l son’s
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Chaska l son’s opinion, Ms. Solberg  si m ply cou ld n ot (a nd  did  not ) est ab lis h s uch
coer cion.  See id . at *99.
231. S ee Solberg, 1997 SACLR LEXIS at *177.
232. S ee id . (Sachs,  J . , concur r ing ) ( st a t ing tha t  the violat ion of section 14 is
“sanct ioned by s ect ion  33, ” th e li mi ta ti on s s ect ion  of th e I nt er im  Con st it ut ion ).
233. Sachs exp r essly r ejects  Cha ska lson’s “coercion” tes t: “I cann ot ag ree  . . . th at
coe rcion , wheth er direct or in direct, mu st be est ablished before section 14 c a n  be  s a id
t o ha ve been  bre ache d.” Id . at  *177 (S ach s, J ., con cur ri ng ). Sa chs  cont e m p la t es
s itua t ions in  wh ich  the sta te h as not  coerced one to violate t heir r eligious beliefs but
nonetheless ha s “en dor s[ed ] a p ar ticu lar  fait h a s a  dir ect  an d se cta ri an  sou rce of
values  for  le gi sla t ion  bi ndi ng on  the w hole n a t ion .” Id . To Sachs, such situations also
violate  section 14. Thus Sachs ’ in te rp re ta tion  of sect ion 1 4 wou ld in clud e t wo n on-
exclusive  p rongs:  in  o rde r  for legislation to violate the freedom of religion, it  must
eith er coerce one t o aban don (or act  contr ar y to) the ir r eligi ous  beliefs or invo lve  an
endorsemen t  of a particular faith or religion. Sachs then see s t wo wa ys i n w hi ch t he
Liqu or  Act might violate religious freedom: (1) if it forced (or in Chask alson’s words,
coerced ) non-Christian  sellers to forego their own non-Sun day day of rest t o  sell
because th ey could not  economically a fford t o avoid sale s  on  two da ys,  or  (2) if t he
symbolic effe ct o f th e Act  wa s a  st at e e nd or se me nt  of th e C h ristia n sa bbat h. See id.
a t  *123-*25.
Like Ch as ka lson , Sa chs  doe s n ot fi nd  th e pr ovis ion  of th e Act  in ques tion to be
coercive: he de ter min ed it d id not give  a compet itive commer c ia l  advan tage  to
Chr i st i an liquor sellers at th e exp e n se of non-Christian  sellers or force stat e-imposed
confo rmance to th e Chr istia n sa bbat h. S ee i d . a t *155-*56. However, Sachs concluded
the Act symbolically en dorsed  Chr istia n h olidays and t he Chr istian sa bbath. “Closed
days” under t he Act include Sunda ys, Christm as, and Good Friday: none of the other
Sou th  African holidays or other days of the weekend are spe cified  close d d ay s. S ach s
sees th is a s a  su bt le b ut  “ine sca pa ble ” sect ar ia n r am ifica ti on of t he  Act . See id . a t
*156-57. If on ly sy mb olica lly, t he  Act en dor ses  Ch ri st ian ity  by for bidd ing  th e sa le of
liqu or  by certain licensees on Christian holy days.
Even  th ough  Sa chs  find s a  viola tion  of section  14, h e con clud es w ith  Ch as ka lson
tha t  th e Act is cons tit ut iona l. See id.  at *177. He reaches t his deter minat ion under
t he limitations clause, section 33 of the Interim Constitution, which states that  even
if a law  violates  th e bill of right s, it m ay st ill be found cons tit u t ional  i f i ts  effect is
limited. If t h e violation of a right guar ant eed under  the bill of rights is rea sonable,
just ifiable in a  dem ocrat ic society, does not  nega te t he es sen tia l conten t of the  righ t
in  question, and for certain  rights (including religion), is necess a ry  in  add it ion  to
be in g re as on able, t he viola tion  will not  res ult  in a  findin g of uncons tit ut iona lity. S ee
S. AF R . CO N S T . § 33(1) (1993 ). Th e Con st itu tion al C our t t hu s m us t m ak e a  tw o-
pronged inquiry when  investigating an  alleged v io la t ion  o f a  fundamen tal  r igh t : “F i r st ,
“coercion-only” tes t, s ta tin g th at  st at e en dors eme nt  of religion
cou ld also violate one’s religious liberties.231 Su bseq ue nt ly,
Sachs believed th a t  t he  Act  did  viola te S olbe rg’s fr eedom  of
reli gion  because it en dorsed t he Ch rist ian s abba th ; however,
the viola t ion w as s o min or t ha t  it  could  be “jus t ified ,” or
permitted, un der  section  33 of the  In ter im Consti tu t ion .232
Accordin gly, Sa chs (a nd  J ud ge Mokgoro, who concur red  in
Sachs’ opinion) agreed wit h Ch ask als on  tha t  the  Act  was
cons t itu t iona l .233 J udge O’Regan  an d t wo other s a gree d wit h
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has th er e be en  a con tr ave nt ion of a  gu ar an te ed r igh t? I f so, is  it  j u st i fi ed  under  t he
lim ita tion  claus e?” S v. Zuma , 1995 (2) SA 642, 654 (CC). Sachs believed t he  viola tion
of section 14 in Solber g ’s  ca se was  just ified: “[The Act], while in deed offendin g again st
sect ion  14, does so in a n in dire c t a n d  m argin al wa y, imposin g rela tively litt le
obl iga tory observa nce, in r espect  of a ma tt er of sligh t  s e ct a r ian  im por t, i n r ela tion  to
days  tha t  have become h igh ly secula rise d.” Solberg, 1997 SACLR LEXIS 30, at *174.
Sachs l is t s  a  number  o f reasons  why the  v io la t io n  is  in significan t in  th is case . See id.
*171-*77. Sachs ’ ana lys is , t he re fo re,  is  t ha t  t he Act violate s t he  fre edom  of re ligion
by endorsing a particular religious belief (Christianity) but tha t the violation is not
se r ious enou gh t o declare  th e section  of the Act in q ues tion u nconst itu tiona l.
Sach’s opin ion  is  va luabl e in se vera l other  ways. P ar agr aph s 142-48 conta in a
lucid an d cogen t d escr ipt ion of t he  pr ovisions of th e Int erim  Const itu tion im plicatin g
reli gion . While the Final Constitution makes some changes to these provisions, Sachs’
exa mi na tion  non et he les s pr ovides a fra mework for un derst andin g how the
Con st itu tion  ap pr oach es r eligi ous issues . Fu rt her , par agr aph s 149-53 conta in
inva lua ble in for ma ti on  on  fre ed om  of re ligi on  (or  ra th er , viola tion s t he re of )  du r ing the
apa rt heid  per iod. T his  his tor y will doubtlessly be used in furt her cases, since th e
Cou r t  often conside rs S out h Africa’s hist orical cont ext im port an t in  its d ecisions . S ee,
e.g., Br in k v . Ki ts ho ff NO , 19 96 (4 ) SA 1 97,  216 -17 (C C) (“Our  hist ory is of par ticula r
re leva nce  to t he  conce pt  of equ al it y. Th e po licy of a pa rt he id, i n l aw  an d in  fact ,
syst ema tically  discrim ina ted a gain st bla ck people in  all a spects of social life. . . . The
deep scar s of this a ppallin g progr am me a re s till visible in  our s ociety. It is in  t he
l igh t o f t ha t  h i sto r y a n d  the  endur ing l egacy  tha t  it  bequeathed  tha t  t he  equa li t y
clause [of th e I nt er im  Con st it ut ion ] ne ed s t o be  in te rp re te d.”).
234. S ee Solberg, 1997 SACLR LEXIS at *120.
235. S ee id . at  *115-*16 (O’Regan , J., dis sen tin g). Ju dge O’Regan ’s in te rp re ta tion
of the r eligion clause is similar t o Sachs’: “[We must] be sat isfied . . . th at  th ere is
no dir ect  coer cion of r eligi ous  beli ef. We  will a lso h av e to be sa t i sf ied  tha t  there  has
been no  inequ it ab le  or  un fa i r  preferen ce [or end orsem ent ] of one r eligion over  oth ers .”
Id . a t  *112-*1 3; see also id. at  *115  (“In  my  vie w, t he  re qu ir em en ts  of th e
Con st itu tion  r equ ir e  more  of  the  legi sl a tu re than  t h a t  it refrain from coercion. It
requires  in  addi t ion  tha t t he le gisl at ur e r efr ain  from  favou ri ng  [en dor sin g] one
religion  over ot her s. Fa irn ess a nd eve n-ha nded nes s in r elat ion to diver se r eligions is
a  necessary component of freedom of religion.”). She, like Sa chs , de te rm in es  th e Act
does in fact  “give a legisla tive e ndor sem ent  to Ch rist ian ity, bu t n ot to ot her  religion s.”
Id . at *114. However, unlike Sachs, O’Rega n  con clu de s t ha t t he  viol at ion  of th e
re ligion  clause cannot be justified. She asks, if the purpose of the closed days is  t o
re st ri ct  cons um pt ion of a lcohol , wh y ar e n ot ot he r t ra dit iona lly hea vy-drink ing da ys
not  i n clud ed a s clos ed d ays ? Sh e n ote s a  var iet y of non -re ligiou s h olida ys t ha t a re  not
closed days b ut  on which  drin king is  grea t. F ur th er, a lcohol may be sold under other
licenses on closed days: only grocers’ licenses (which is the license Solberg held) a r e
restricted. Deter min ing t ha t t he pu rpose of th e law (re str ict ing  dr ink ing ) does  not
meet  th e effect of the la w (only rest rictin g drin king on  tr adit ion a l ly  Ch r istia n h oly
da ys),  sh e con clud es t ha t t he  viola tion  of th e r eligi on cla us e, wh ile “n ot s eve re  or
Sachs tha t  Chaska l son’s  “coercion-on ly” t est  was  not  th e on ly
way reli giou s freedom cou ld be v iola ted  and  tha t  st a te
endorsement  of religion als o q u alified  as a  viola t ion  of freedom
of religion; however, she felt th e Act n ot only violated  re ligious
freedom but th at it  could not be justified.234 O’Regan  would
ha ve declar ed t he Act u ncons tit ut iona l.235
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egregiou s,” is ser ious en ough  not  to be ju stified  un der  section  33. See id.  at *119-*20.
Accordin gly, she w ould st rike  down a s un constit ut ional t he por tion of th e Act ma king
it  illegal to sell alcohol under certain licenses on closed days.
236. Som e migh t  a rgue tha t  Solberg i s a  poor  r eligi ou s fr eedom cas e becau se it
r e su lt s in t he r ejection of Ms. Solberg’s religious freedom ar gumen t. She ha d
challenged th e L iqu or  Act b eca us e, i n h er  mi nd , it  for ced  he r t o r efr ai n fr om se ll ing
on  some one els e’s holy d ay. H owever, t he Con stit ut ional Cou rt  judges a re a bsolut ely
corr ect  wh en  th ey a ss er t t ha t M s. S olbe rg ’s ca se  is u lt im at ely e conom ic in  n a t ure  and
tha t  her  religiou s free dom is sue  is “art ificial” at bes t. See id.  at *127 (Sach s, J .,
con cur ri ng ). As Judge Sachs st ated : “[Th is] challenge . . . came not from believers
whose faith was being th reat ened, but from grocers whose profits were being l imit ed.”
Id . Religious liberty is not strengthened when u sed to enhance economic gains as
argued  by M s. S olbe rg . Wit h a  diffe re nt  se t of fa cts —wit h m ore  evid en ce t h a t  a
“be li ever [ ’] s . . . faith w as be ing t hr ea te ne d”—t he r esu lt per ha ps would  an d sh ould
be different . B u t  under  these facts, religious freedom should not be the impet us
beh ind Ms. Solber g’s fur th er econom ic well being.
237. S ee id . at  *99; id . at  *115 (O ’Rega n, J ., dis sen tin g); i d . at  *177 (Sach s, J .,
con cur ri ng ).
238. 1995 (4) SA 2 84 (Zi mb .).
239. S ee id .
240. S ee id .
241. S ee id . at 291.
242. S ee id . The case is noteworthy for two additional reasons. First, Ch ikweche
is th e on ly sou th er n Afr ican  cas e t o at te mp t t o cons tit ut iona lly d efin e “re ligion .” S ee
id . at  289-90. In de fining “religion,” the  Court  exam ined case  law from the Un ited
Stat es and Ca nada , as well as a t reat ise on Indian  constitut ional law. S ee id . (citing
United  Sta tes v. Ba llar d, 322 U.S . 78 (1944), Regina v. Big M  Drug Mar t Lt d., [1985]
D.L.R. (4th) 321, and Constitutiona l Law of In dia  by J .N.  Pa nd ey). T he se ci ta tion s
The  case’s resu lt  is clear: the Act is constitutional, and Mrs.
Solberg goes to jail. 236 Another a spect of the case is also lucid:
a l l Cons t itu t iona l  Cour t  judges beli eve  tha t  coer cin g on e t o act
con t r a ry to one’s reli giou s b eli efs  is  su fficie n t  to sh ow a
viola t ion  of one ’s fre edom  of religion .2 3 7  This h olding is correct
and is consist ent  with  In  Re Chikw eche,238 a  Zimbabwean
reli giou s liberty case t ha t precedes S olberg. This case involved
the bar  ad mis sion of a dr ead lock-donning Rasta fa r ian . A
Zimbabwean  judge r efu se d t o a d m inis ter  th e ba r a dm ission
oa th to Mr. Ch ikwech e, consider ing him  un kep t a nd  imp roper ly
dres sed because of his dreadlocks.239 Chikweche challenged the
judge’s decision before the Zim ba bwe S upr em e Cour t , wh ich
deter m ined th at  th e judge’s actions violated t he Zimbabwea n
Con st it u t ion .240 The Court  observed that th e judge’s ru ling
esse nt ially forced  (or  coer ced ) Ch ik weche to choose bet ween  his
reli giou s beliefs a nd  being a ble t o ta ke t he b ar  ad mis sion
oa th .241 This coercion, the Court  deter mined , violated
Chikweche’s religiou s  fr eedom.242 S olberg ru les consis ten tly
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suggest th e Cou rt  will g ive a  gr ea t a mou nt  of defer en ce t o i n di vi du a ls an d th eir
cons cien ce in  de ter min in g w hat  “rel ig ion” they  a re,  so lon g a s on e’s  “rel igious” beli efs
do not in jure  th eir n eighbor s or in fringe on  th eir n eighbor ’s re ligious be liefs. See id.
a t  290. One  need  not s how one’s religion h as a  belief in  Deit y or is even organized,
bu t one m ust  show s incer ity of belief. See id.  This resul ts  in what  the Court  called
a  “wi de  and n on -t ec hn ica l” d ef in it ion  of “r el ig ion .” See id.
Second, after examining the t enets of Rastafarianism, the Court  determined t ha t
it  was  a r eligion. See id.  a t 287-89. This is  in a ccordan ce with  Un ited S ta tes ca se law
cited by  t h e cour t .  See id.  at  288-89 (citing Reed v. F au lkne r, 842 F .2d 960 (7th  Cir.
1988) (up hol din g a  dis tr ict  cour t’s fin din g th at  Ra st afa ri an ism  is a  re ligion  for
purposes  of th e F ir st  Ame nd me nt )).
243. F or  instan ce, religious freedom jurispruden ce under t he Firs t Amendm ent
to th e Un ited S ta tes C onst itu tion did  not be gin u n til th e la te 1800s—over a h undr ed
yea r s aft er  th e Co ns ti tu ti on  wa s r at ified. S ee Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291
(1899) (Esta blishm ent  Clau se); Reynolds v. U nit ed Stat es, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (Free
E x er cise Cla us e); ST E VE N  H. SH I F F R I N  & J E S S E  H. CH O P E R, TH E  F IRST AM E ND M E NT
616, 695 (2d ed. 1996) (citing t hes e two cas es). Ju risp r u d e n ce  u nder the First
Amendmen t is still evolving to a great extent. The Constitu tiona l Court may be wise
to “not . . . lay down s weepin g int erpr eta tions  at  th is sta ge but  . . . allow doctrin e
t o deve lop slowly and, hopefully, surely, on a case by case basis with special emp hasis
on  th e act ua l conte xt in  which  each  proble m a rose.” Solberg, 1997 SACLR LEXIS a t
*129 (Sa chs , J ., con cur ri ng ). Th is i s e sp ecia lly t ru e on  an  iss ue  su ch  a s  t he r eligi on
clause where th e Court appear s so heavily divided.
with  Chikweche, and both sh ould be relied upon by other
southern African judges.
However , the  quest ion  S olberg does not an swer is wh eth er
someth ing less th an  outr ight coercion (i.e. endorsemen t a s
discussed  by Sachs a nd O’Rega n) a lso viola tes  freedom  of
religion . Ch ask a lson’s “coer cion -only” t es t  se cured  only fou r
votes. Sachs’ “e ithe r  coe rcion  or  endor semen t” theory  seems to
have gath ered five votes, includin g the t hr ee O’Rega n
dissenters; however , it s a pp lica t ion  in  re la t ion  to the
lim it a t ion s clause was inconsistent between the two camps.
One cou ld p redi ct  tha t  in  a  fu tu re  case the  Sachs  and  O’Regan
camps ma y again join at  least  in th eory, but in pr actice the
groups  migh t  aga in  diverge, as t hey did in t his case.
Alter na tive ly, Chaska l son  could gain swing votes and t he
coercion-only test  could win  the day. Perhaps after an other case
the Cou r t ’s in ter pr et a t ion  of the r eli gion  cla use  wil l be come
more appa rent . On th e other  hand, it  may rema in unsettled for
some tim e.243
While  some ar gue th at  th e endorsem ent  t e st  should be
app lied in Sou th  Africa to det erm ine a  violat ion  of reli giou s
liber ty,  th e coercion t est  pr ovides a  bet te r, br ight -line t est . A
major it y of the  judges  on  the  Cons t itu t iona l  Cour t—the  ones
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244. S ee Solberg, 1997 SACLR LE XIS at  *115 (O’Rega n, J ., dissen tin g); i d . a t
*177 (Sa chs , J ., con cur ri ng ).
245. Mureinik , supra  no te  70,  at  45 (ci ta ti on s om it te d).
246. S ee Wallace v. J affree, 472 U .S. 38, 57 n.45  (1985) (“Wha t wa s mis sing i n
the ap pe lla nt s’ eye s a t t he  ti me  of th e e na ctm en t of [a n  Al a ba m a s t a tu t e au thor i zing
a  1-min u te pe riod of silence in  all pu blic schools for medit at ion or volun ta ry
p raye r ]—and the re fo re wha t  is  p reci se ly  the a spec t  tha t  makes the  s t atu t e
uncons t i tu t iona l—was the State’s endorsement  and promotion of religion and a
par t i cu la r re ligi ou s p ra cti ce.”).
247. S ee Capitol Squa re Review an d Advisory Board v. P inett e, 515 U.S. 753
(199 5); see also SHIFF RIN  & CH O P E R, supra  not e 243, at 690 (discussing the Supr eme
Cour t ’s division on t he scope of th e end orsem ent  test  in Capital Squ are).
248. S ee, e.g., Solberg, 1997 SACLR LEXIS 30, at  *91 (discussin g Regina v. Big
M Drug Mar t,  L td.,  (1985) 18 DLR (4th) 321, and stress ing  its  em ph as is on  coer cion,
cons t r a in t , an d for ce a s d et er mi na ti ve of v iola ti on s of r eligi ous  libe rt ies ); In re
C h ik w ec h e, 1995 (4) 284 (Zimb.) (using a coer cion test  to find a  violation of reli giou s
lib er ti es ). Tha t  Canada  has no t  adop ted the  endor semen t  t es t  is e sp ecia l ly  impor t an t
for  South  Africa becaus e the S outh African Bill of Rights wa s drafted based on  the
Canadian  Cha rt er. See also Corde r, supra  not e 52, a t 514 . 
joining th e O’Regan  diss en t a nd  th e Sa chs’ concur re nce—h ave
suggest ed tha t th ey would support an endorsement test .
However , the two opinions’ use of th e test  resu lted in d ifferen t
out comes in  S olberg.244 Addit iona lly, th e l at e Sou th  Afr ican  l aw
Professor  Et ienne Mureinik  touched on  how endor semen t  is
“inher ent ly coercive”:
S t a t e  en dor sem en t of a  re ligi ou s  p e r s p ec t iv e —b e  it  o n ly  t h e
per spe ctiv e  t h a t  r e l ig ion  i s  to  be  prefer r ed  to  i r re l ig ion—tu rn s
those  w h o a d h e r e t o t h a t  p e r sp e c t i v e  in to  in s ide r s ,  and  th ose
w h o  d o  n o t  i n t o  o u t s i d e r s .  T h a t  a l o n e  p u t s
p r e s su r e — g ov e r n m e n t a l p r es su r e, s in ce it  com es  from  th e
st at e—on  n on -ad h er en ts  wh ich  m ay  be con sid er ed  coer cion .245
However , the difference in result in th e O’Regan an d Sachs’
opin ion s shows one pr oblem with t he en dorsem e n t test —two
differen t  gr oups of people ap plying t he t est  end  up  with  a
differen t  resu lt. At least  one U.S. Supreme Court case
eva lua te s a  s t a te s t a tu te based on  endorsement .246  However,
the endorsem ent  test  as a  whole has  not been  adopted as  the
dete rmin ing factor  for  whether  the Free Exerci se  Clause  of the
U.S. Constitut ion has been violated,247 and  othe r  cour t s h ave
not  used the endorsement test t o dete rm ine violat ions of th eir
cons t itu t ions protecting religious liber ty. 248 Coercion—be it
di rect  or ind irect —provides a br ight line a nd a voids pr oblems
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249. S ee Solberg, 19 97 S ACLR  LE XIS  at  *159  (Sa chs , J ., con cur ri ng ) (“Th e
s t r ength  of th e O’Conn or J ’s a pp roa ch,  na me ly it s a ll-en comp as sin g ch ar act er  wh ich
lift s  it out of formu laic reasoning and combines the r elationship between purpos e  a nd
effect , also a ppea rs t o be its  weak nes s. It  in di cat es t he b road  qu est ion  to be a sk ed,
bu t not  th e speci fic cr iter ia t o be u sed  for t he a ns wer . M ore especially, i t  does l i t t le to
establish from  wh ose st an dp oin t t he m essage by th e St ate sh ould  be consid ered. What
comes through as an  innocuous part of daily living to one person who happens to
inh abit  a pa rt icular  int ellectual an d spiritual universe, might be communicated as
oppres sive and exclusiona ry to an other  who lives in a different r ealm of belief.  What
may be s o tr iflin g in  th e e yes  of m em ber s of t he  ma jor it y or  dom in an t s ect ion  of th e
popu lat ion  as  to be  inv is ible , may assu me qu ite la rge pr oportion s an d be em inen tly
rea l, hur tful an d oppressive to th ose upon whom  it impa cts. This will especially be
the case when wha t is appar ently ha rmless is experienced by members  of the a ffected
group as s ympt omat ic of a wide a nd pe rva s iv e p a t t ern  o f marg ina l is a t ion  and
disa dvan ta ge.” (em ph as is a dd ed ) (foot no te  om it te d)).
250. S ee supra  no t e 209  and accompany ing  t ex t .
251. S ee Solberg, 1997 SACLR LEXIS at  *99; i d . at  *115 (O’Rega n, J .,
dis se nt in g); i d . at  *177  (Sa chs , J ., con cur ri ng ).
252. In  the a bsen ce of m ore  clea r d octr ine  from  Sou th  Africa  on it s r eligi on
clause, o ther  sou thern  Afr ican  na t ions may  want  to read  S olber g carefu lly, limitin g
i t s hold ing  to t he  su fficien cy of coer cion t o est ab lish  viola tion  of re ligiou s fr eed om,
and otherwise only using th at wh ich definitely applies to the specific cons tit ut iona l
and historical context of those nations.
253. 1997 (2) SA 2 61 (C C).
evident  in t he e nd orsem ent  regim e.2 4 9 Fu rt her , it is a sa fer
init ial  pos it ion , a nd i t s u se  a llow s t he S outh  Afr ica n  case law to
develop  slowly a nd  delibe ra tive ly—a jud icially conse rva tive
resul t the Con stitutional Court  has appr oved.250 While u sin g
the en dor se men t  tes t  may be  en t icin g for  the Const i t ut iona l
Cour t , a bet ter  posit ion for now wou ld be  to follow Ch ask a lson’s
coercion-only test .
In  any ca se , t he on ly clea r  hold in g fr om S olberg,  and a  poin t
of l aw  tha t  othe r  sou the rn Afr i can  na t ion s  ca n  t ake the refrom,
is that  man ifest coercion suffices  to viola te fr eedom  of
reli gion .251 Wheth er coercion is n ecessar y or  whether  a  showing
of s t a te endor se men t  of reli gion  is  a lso su fficie n t  to sh ow
encroachment on freedom of religion rema ins undecided.252
One se es , t hen , t h ree  in it ia l ca se s impl ica t in g r eli giou s
fr eedom in S out h Africa . The  first , Fras er, h olds t ha t  one
cannot  be  discr im in a ted  aga in st  ba se d on  one’s reli gion  and
t h a t  leg is la t ion  tha t  di ffer en t ia tes  be tween  in divid ua ls  on the
bas is of religion —even in dir ectly—is u ncons tit ut iona l.253
Gauteng S chool fur th er  finds , howeve r, t ha t r eli gion s w ill  not
be given special privileges: in th e cont ext of religiously founded
sch ools , th e Cons t itu t iona l  Cour t  he ld  tha t  the re ligions  would
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254. 1996 (3) SA 1 65 (C C).
255. 1997 SAC LR L EXI S 3 0 (CC , Oct . 6,  199 7).
256. S ee S v. Ntesang, 1995 SACLR LEXIS 220  (Bots. J an . 30, 1995); S v.
Makwan yane,  199 5 (3) S A 391  (CC).
257. S ee S v. Williams , 1995 (3) SA 632, 642, 645 (CC ) (discussin g cases d eciding
upon th e con st itu tion ali ty of cor por al  pun ishm ent  in Bot swa na , Lesot ho, Na mibia , an d
Zim ba bwe ).
258. Reverse onus provisions presum e the defendan t guilty and pu t th e “on u s”
(respon sibility) of pr ovin g oth er wis e on  th e de fen da nt . Se ver al s out he rn  Africa n cou rt s
ha ve discus sed t he con stit ut iona lity of th ese p rovision s. S ee, e.g., S v. Mh lun gu, 1 995
SACLR LEXIS 247 (CC J un e 8,  199 5); S  v. Zu ma , 19 95 (2 ) SA 6 42,  654  (CC);
Fre i remar  SA v.  Pr ose cut or -Gen er al  of Na mibia , 1994 SACLR LEXIS 242 (Nam ib.
Apr. 8, 1 994 ); S v.  Ch ogu gu dza , 1 S ACLR  LE XIS  873  (Zim b. J an . 8,  199 6).
259. S ee cases cited supra  notes 12, 20.
have to pay for t he schools ra th er t ha n h ave th e govern men t
pick up t he t ab. 254 Fin ally, S olberg shows th a t  e ithe r  di r ect  or
in di rect  coer cion  to act  cont ra ry t o one’s reli giou s beliefs is a
viola t ion  of one’s freedom  of reli gion .255
B. Why S outhern Africa Sh ould Follow S outh African
R eligiou s Freed om  Case L aw
 C ou r t s  in south ern  Africa often review sim ila r
const i tu t iona l issues: in r ecent year s, a n um ber of sout her n
Afr ica n  cour t s  have  hea rd  the same types  of cons t it u t iona l
cases on  is sues  r anging from the  dea th  pena lty256 and corpora l
pun ishment 257 t o reverse onus provisions in criminal statut es.258
Sou the rn Afr ican  cour t s  often  use  each  others’ case l aw as
per su as ive preceden t if the p revious ca se  is  app lica ble  to the
case at ha nd.259 E ven t hough t her e ha ve not been m an y recent
reli giou s freedom cases in sout her n African coun tr ies other
than  Sout h Africa , it is  inevi ta ble tha t  such  cases  wil l be heard
in  the fu tu re . The South  Afr ican  Cons t itu t iona l  Cour t  deci sions
in Fras er, Gauteng  School,  and S olberg ha ve set  an  examp le for
the p rotect ion  of reli giou s liber ty in  sou ther n  Afr ica  and shou ld
be followe d.  Fur ther , one a sp ect  of S olberg corresponds with  a
prev ious Zimbabwean  case. When r eligious freedom cas es do
arise in  other southern African countries, and  to the  ex ten t  tha t
the holdings  in  Fras er, Gauteng  School,  and S olberg a r e
app licable, court s in other sout hern  African coun tr ies sh ould
look  to these  Sou th  Afr i can  deci sions  a s per suasive  preceden t .
App lica t ion  of th ese South  African d ecisions will not be
cons t itu t iona l ly challenging: as m ent ioned pr evious ly, th e
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260. S ee supra  Part  III.
261. S ee supra  Part  I.
262. Molapo v. Di re ctor  of Pu blic P ros ecu ti on s, 1997 SACLR LEXIS 13, *16, *18
(Les oth o J un e 18 , 19 97).
sou the rn African  const it u t ion a l cla use s impl ica t in g fr eedom  of
reli gion  ar e all fa irly sim ilar .260 On  t heir faces, these
cons t itu t ions s t rong ly compel t he  pr otect ion of religiou s liber ty.
While  i t  is  t rue tha t  some sou thern  Afr i ca n  count r i es  have  had
tr ouble of lat e fully ma kin g th e t ra ns ition  to de mocra cy,261 t ha t
t r ans it i on  can  be  more easi ly m ade , a t  lea st  in  ter ms of
reli giou s liber ty, by t he a pp lica t ion  of Sou t h  Afr ica ’s r eli giou s
freedom decisions.
By so doing, south ern  Afr ica n  count rie s will be  followin g th e
lead  tha t  Sou th  Afr ica  has  ma de du rin g th e year s sin ce its
recen t ele ctions  an d t ra ns ition  to fu l l democracy in 199 4. While
other  s ou t h ern  Afr ican  na t ions  may have l ed  ou t  in  democracy
and human r igh t s  dur ing  apar t heid , it  app ea rs t ha t  Sou th
Afr ica  ha s qu ickly su rp as sed t hem  an d is  th e dem ocrat ic nat ion
to follow in souther n  Afr ica . Th e words  of one ju dge fr om
Lesotho’s h igh es t  cour t , r u lin g in  conforman ce with  a  Sou th
Afr ica n  Constitu tional Cour t judgm ent  gran ting a n a ccused
defendan t  th e r ight  to h ave  access to the pr osecut or’s file on his
case , ar e pa rt icula rly r eleva nt :
I t  i s  impor t an t  t o  no te  tha t  o f a l l  [Leso tho’s ]  ne igh bou rin g
co u n t r ie s [S ou t h  Afr ica ] is w h er e t h e w in ds  of cha n ge [on
gran t ing  a  de fenda n t  t he  r igh t  t o  h i s  cr imina l  fi l e ] a l l  s t a r t ed .
. . . .
Ad m i t t e d l y i t i s h a r d  t o i m a gi n e a n y  co u n t r y w it h  a  w or s e
r e co rd  of v iola t ion s  of h u m a n  r ig h ts  t h a n  Sou t h  A fr ica . T h a t
howeve r  is of n o cons equ en ce a s fa r a s t h e ex er cise  befor e m e
is con cer n ed . Th is is  so be cau se  in  m y ju dg m en t a n y viola tion s
of h u m a n  ri gh ts  re ga r dl es s of t h e d eg r ee  th er eof d e s e r v e  to  be
s t am ped  ou t  in a  jus t d em ocra tic societ y th at  pr ides  its elf wit h
a  Bill  of Rig h ts  en tr en ch ed  in  th e C on st itu tio n  su ch  a s  Le sot h o
i s . Accordingly I  a m  p r e pa r e d t o a d op t  t h e a p p roa ch  of t h e
C on s t it u t ion a l C ou r t  . . . . Afte r a ll Le sot h o h as  h ad  its  own
fair  sh ar e of re pr ess ion , a u tocr acy  an d or  dict at ors h ip of s om e
sor t  as  well a s pow er  st ru ggles  in w hich  fun da m en ta l hu m an
r i gh t s  inevi ta b ly  t ook t h e ba ck s ea t. T h e ex pe rie n ces of S ou th
A fr i ca  a r e  t h er e fo re  n ot  w it h ou t  r e le va n c e t o t h i s co u n t r y.262
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263. Even  if oth er  sou th er n Afr ican  cour ts  do n ot e xpr ess ly follow t he se d ecis ions ,
they  will ce rt ain ly fin d t he  cas es r ele van t a nd  im por ta nt  to e xa m ine  in  l igh t  of  the
sparse  sou th er n Afr ican  re ligiou s fr eed om case law. S ee, e.g., Chinam ora v. Angwa
Furn i she r s (Pvt ) Lt d., 1 996 S ACLR L EXIS  54, *2 1-*25, *41-*46 (Zimb. Nov. 28, 1996)
(Zimbabwe  Supreme  Cour t  examin ing at  leng th , bu t n ot follow ing  beca us e of
d is t ingu ish ing fact s, t wo S ou th  Afri can  Con st it ut ion al  Cou rt  de cisi on s).
264. 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC) (holding that  discrimination based on r eligion violates
re ligious fre ed om ).
265. 1996 (3) SA 165 (CC) (findi n g th at  re ligiou s gr oup s m us t p ay t he  cost  of
r e ligious -run  sch oolin g).
266. 1997 SAC LR L EXI S 3 0 (CC  Oct . 6,  199 7).
Oth er  south ern  African n at ions ar e sur e to find this ju dge’s
words  ap plicable t o th e Sout h African  decisions  in Fraser ,
Gau teng S chool,  and S olberg.263 Th e win ds  of const it u t ion a l
pr otection  of reli giou s l ibe r ty in  sou t h e r n  Africa ar e blowing
nor th  from Sou th  Afr i ca , and  othe r  sou the rn Afr i ca n  na t ions
shou ld fol low su i t.
V. CO N C L U S I O N
This  Comment  has examined th e va r iou s s outher n  Afr ica n
const it u t ion a l cla use s r ela t in g t o reli giou s l ibe r ty, s howin g h ow
many of them a re similar and could be interpr eted (and indeed
a re be in g in ter pr et ed ) a lik e. I t  has a lso ana lyzed  th ree  recen t
Sou th African ca ses concer nin g religious libert y and  discussed
the usefulness of each cas e in fu tu re r eligious liber ty cas es in
sou the rn Africa. These cases, Fras er,264 t he Gauteng  School
case,265 and S olberg,266 a r e  sound  deci sions  and a re per su as ive
preceden t tha t  sh ould  be  reli ed  upon  in  other  sou thern  Afr ican
court s. They begin to define th e scope of religious liber ty in
sout he rn Afr i ca . When  sou the rn Afr i can  cour t s  decide  fu tu re
cases, i t  is  hoped  tha t  they will cont in ue t o res pe ct  the r eli giou s
liberty so st ron gly enu mer at ed in  t hese  coun t r i es ’ cons t itu t ions
an d in th e curren t Sout h African  case law.
Richard  Cam eron Bla ke & Lonn L itchfield
